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The technological developments of recent decades have allowed
companies to collect staggering amounts of consumer data by offering
"free" access to digital products like search engines and social-media
platforms. Scholars in a variety of fields recognize that this practice rep-
resents a new type of market exchange, but our tax laws and tax scholars
have thus far ignored this aspect of the new economy. That inattention
means that transactions in data currently benefit from an implicit exemp-
tion from tax. This Article brings light to that issue by providing the first
analysis of the relationship between the personal-data market and our
domestic tax instruments. That nalysis shows that personal-data transac-
tions do fit within those tax instruments, but that several factors will pre-
vent them from actually being taxed. The resulting tax preference for
data creates a distortion in the market that results in lost tax revenue and
that undermines efforts to reform the personal-data market to better ac-
count for individual privacy interests. This Article considers those issues
and concludes by urging the recognition of the tax preference for data in
the broader U.S. regulatory structure related to data and personal privacy.
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INTRODUCTION
The modem Internet ecosystem is largely built on the collection,
analysis, and monetization of consumer data. The business model popu-
larized by companies like Facebook and Google operates by offering
consumers access to desirable digital products in exchange for the oppor-
tunity to collect their personal information. Google, for example, pro-
vides access to its search engine, Gmail, and Google Docs without charg-
ing a cash fee. Instead, it makes money by monitoring consumers' use of
those products and by using the resulting data to sell targeted advertis-
ing.' Of course, Google is just the tip of the iceberg. Individuals now
create data for a wide range of companies in every industry and of every
size. Consumer information is the fuel of the "big data" era.2
I. See Privacy Policy, GOOGLE.COM, https://www.google.com/policies/privacy/ (last modi-
fied Aug. 29, 2016) (indicating that Google "use[s] various technologies to collect and store infor-
mation when you visit a Google service " for purposes such as generating advertising revenue);
Privacy: Your Data, GOOGLE.COM, https://privacy.google.com/data-we-collect.html (last visited
Aug. 31, 2016) (indicating that Google "store[s] and protect[s] what you create using [its] services");
see also ANNA BERNASEK & D. T. MONGAN, ALL YOU CAN PAY: How COMPANIES USE OUR DATA
To EMPTY OUR WALLETS 61-66 (2015) (discussing Google's scanning practices with respect to its
Gmail service).
2. Some uses of those data are positive and some are negative. Just as data can improve how
we address problems in the energy and health sectors, they can be used to discriminate against indi-
viduals or to exploit their personal psychological traits to sell them more widgets. Michael Mattioli,
Disclosing Big Data, 99 MINN. L. REV. 535, 539-44 (2014) (discussing the potential benefits of big
data); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2010,
2021-31 (2013) (discussing the information that is gleaned from the collection of data); Omer Tene
& Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in the Age of Analytics, 11 Nw. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 239, 243-56 (2013) (discussing the range of potential costs and benefits of
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This market reality is well known by technologists and privacy
scholars who have long recognized that data function as an asset, or even
as a currency, in today's world.3 These scholars accept that the digital
products of today's economy are not free even though they are provided
without a cash charge. Instead, consumers buy access to those products
with their data.4 Some analysts even explicitly characterize this practice
as a new form of barter transaction.5
The recognition of this market reality and the growth and prolifera-
tion of the market in personal data have spawned a significant literature
regarding the intersection of personal data, privacy, and the Internet.6
Scholars have also evaluated the impact of this data economy on our
nation's consumer-protection and antitrust laws.7 Others have looked at
big data); Adrienne LaFrance, People's Deepest, Darkest Google Searches Are Being Used Against
Them, ATLANTIC (Nov. 3, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/1 1/google-
searches-privacy-danger/413614.
3. WORLD ECON. FORUM, PERSONAL DATA: THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW ASSET CLASS 18-
19 (2011) [hereinafter WORLD ECON. FORUM, PERSONAL DATA],
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEFITTCPersonalDataNewAssetReport_2011 .pdf; WORLD
ECON. FORUM, RETHINKING PERSONAL DATA: STRENGTHENING TRUST 7 (2012) [hereinafter
WORLD ECON. FORUM, TRUST],
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF ITRethinkingPersonalDataReport 2012.pdf; James C.
Cooper, Privacy and Antitrust: Underpants Gnomes, the First Amendment, and Subjectivity, 20 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 1129, 1130 (2013). The role of personal data in the new economy has been long
recognized. See JOHN HAGEL III & MARC SINGER, NET WORTH: SHAPING MARKETS WHEN
CUSTOMERS MAKE THE RULES, at xiii (1999) ("In many respects, we are moving from an era of
competition on the Internet, which represented the battle for traffic, into a new era in which the
defining battle is that for customer profiles. The winners and losers in this new era will be deter-
mined by who has rights to on-line [sic] customer profiles.").
4. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 3, at 1129-31; Chris Jay Hoofnagle & Jan Whittington,
Free: Accounting for the Costs of the Internet's Most Popular Price, 61 UCLA L. REV. 606, 608
(2014).
5. Erin Bernstein & Theresa J. Lee, Where the Consumer Is the Commodity: The Difficulty
with the Current Definition of Commercial Speech, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 39, 82 (2013); Paul M.
Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055, 2056 (2004); Tene &
Polonetsky, supra note 2, at 255. This recognition goes well beyond the academe. See Brad Meehan,
Responsible Personalization: How Brands Can Build Trust with Consumers, ADVERTISINGAGE
(Aug. 7, 2015), http://adage.com/article/digitalnext/responsible-personalization-brands-build-
trust/299843/AdvertisingAge (labeling the exchange of information for access to web services as
"the bartering of information" and noting that personal data are used "as a currency to 'pay for'
information"); Press Release, Canadian Council of Pub. Relations Firms, Personal Data and Brand
Trust: A Modem-Day Barter System (July 15, 2015, 16:08), http://www.pmewswire.com/news-
releases/personal-data-and-brand-trust-a-modem-day-barter-system-515487331 html (discussing
consumers' willingness to barter with their data); Doug Laney, The (Possible) Tax Advantages of
Bartering with Information, GARTNER BLOG NETWORK (Aug. 10, 2014),
http://blogs.gartner.com/doug-laney/the-possible-tax-advantages-of-bartering-with-information/.
6. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives, Informational Privacy and the Subject as
Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1374-75 (2000); James P. Nehf, Recognizing the Societal Value in
Information Privacy, 78 WASH. L. REV. 1, 1-4 (2003); Scott R. Peppet, Unraveling Privacy: The
Personal Prospectus and the Threat of a Full-Disclosure Future, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 1153, 1154-56
(2011); Paula Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1126-28
(2000); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 16 10-
13 (1999); Schwartz, supra note 5, at 2056-59; Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90
CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1088-90 (2002); Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 2, at 240-41.
7. See, e.g., Ryan Calo, Consumer Subject Review Boards: A Thought Experiment, 66 STAN.
L. REV. ONLINE 97, 97-100 (2013) (discussing consumer privacy law and big data); Cooper, supra
note 3, at 1129-30 (discussing privacy considerations in antitrust issues); Hoofnagle & Whittington,
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the impact of this use of data on our Fourth Amendment protections.8
Notwithstanding this vast literature and the broad recognition of the role
of data as an asset in today's economy, however, the market for personal
data has been virtually invisible to our tax system and to our tax scholars.
The only meaningful analyses of the tax consequences of the personal-
data economy have occurred in the international arena, but those anal-
yses have largely focused on the digital economy, writ large, rather than
on the specific impact of the use of data in that economy.9 They have
also focused narrowly on the ability of firms to shift value to jurisdic-
tions with low or no tax and the resulting impact on the global allocation
of the corporate income-tax base.10 That more limited focus has meant
that some very basic questions have gone unexplored. Are personal-data
transactions taxable events under U.S. tax laws? If so, would it be possi-
ble to tax them? Should we tax them? Are there consequences that stem
from not taxing them?
The failure to consider these questions is remarkable. The personal-
data market is one in which nearly every U.S. taxpayer is taking part and
one from which they derive great value. The unique aspects of the per-
sonal-data economy also raise critical questions regarding the design of
our tax systems for the future. The purpose of this Article is to explore
those issues by analyzing how the personal-data economy intersects with
the U.S. tax system. Doing so serves several purposes. First, it introduces
the tax community and tax scholarship to the personal-data market. Se-
cond, it introduces tax considerations to those evaluating the personal-
data market. Finally, it evaluates the dynamic relationship between the
tax and data worlds. In that vein, it demonstrates how the personal-data
market is escaping and undermining our domestic tax instruments and
how we might change those tax instruments to compensate. It also evalu-
ates how our taxes might impact the evolution of the personal-data mar-
ket. To the extent that the current system provides a tax preference for
the use of data," that tax preference might well work as a tax penalty on
the development of a data market that is more protective of individual
supra note 4, at 657-59 (evaluating consumer-protection and privacy issues); John M. Newman,
Antitrust in Zero-Price Markets: Foundations, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 151-52 (2015) [hereinafter
Newman, Zero-Price] (discussing antitrust issues in "zero-price markets"); Nathan Newman,
Search, Antitrust, and the Economics of the Control of User Data, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 401, 402-05
(2014) (evaluating antitrust implications in Google's use of user data).
8. See generally Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General
Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005 (2010); Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technolo-
gies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801 (2004); Daniel J.
Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV.
1083 (2002) [hereinafter Solove, Digital Dossiers]; Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic
Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1264 (2004). See also Omer Tene, What Google Knows:
Privacy and Internet Search Engines, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1433, 1470-72 (2008).
9. See infra Section II.A (discussing recent reports published by the Organization for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development and researchers hired by the French government).
10. See infra Section II.A.
11. A "tax preference" in this context means a tax-favored status in the form of an implicit tax
exemption for transactions involving data. See infra Section III.B.
148 [Vol. 94:1
TRANSACTING IN DATA
privacy interests. This Article is therefore important both for those inter-
ested in tax policy and for those interested in the structure and evolution
of the personal-data economy. The two are inextricably intertwined, for
better or for worse.
This Article proceeds in three main Parts. Part I provides back-
ground information on the personal-data market and the existing non-tax
analyses of that market. Part II then looks at how the international tax
community has analyzed personal-data exchanges and at how those ex-
changes should be characterized for domestic tax purposes. It disagrees
with the construct that the international community has adopted and ar-
gues that a market-exchange model is appropriate. It then analyzes the
theoretical tax consequences of that characterization and evaluates the
practical impediments that will prevent the taxation of those transactions
under that construct. The conclusion of that analysis is that there is, and
will likely continue to be, a tax preference for the use of data as a curren-
cy.
Part III turns to the available options for addressing the unavoidable
intersection between tax, privacy, and the personal-data economy. It first
looks at how we might either (1) modify our current tax instruments to
best ameliorate the tax preference for data, or (2) use new tax instru-
ments to address that preference or to promote beneficial data practices.
That analysis necessarily evaluates the tax system against the current
personal-data economy. This Article also, however, examines how our
tax systems will likely impact the data economy of the future. It discuss-
es several current movements to modify the personal-data economy to
better account for individuals' privacy interests and analyzes how they
interact with the current personal-data tax exemption. Part III calls for a
more comprehensive approach to privacy and data regulation in the Unit-
ed States, and Part IV concludes.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Personal-Data Market
Data collection is ubiquitous in today's society. The technological
advancements of recent decades have allowed companies to collect and
monetize a staggering amount of data on individual consumers. We now
create data when we go online, drive, exercise, turn on the lights, and
even wash our clothes.1 2 The data market is not new, of course. Compa-
12. See, e.g., THERESA M. PAYTON & THEODORE CLAYPOOLE, PRIVACY IN THE AGE OF BIG
DATA 77, 87, 127-28, 173-74 (2014); Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps
Toward Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REv. 85, 98-104,
108, 112, 114-15, 117 (2014) (discussing the extensive data created by the "Internet of Things");
Kyle Vanhemert, This Brilliant Washing Machine Is a Roadmap for the Internet of Things, WIRED
(Apr. 7, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/04/this-brilliant-intemet-connected-washer-is-
a-roadmap-for-the-internet-of-things/.
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nies have long collected consumer data like names, addresses, and tele-
phone numbers. The data collection of today's economy is simply more
efficient and varied. Instead of asking consumers to fill out notebooks
tracking their television viewing habits, for example, consumers are di-
rectly tracked through their cable boxes.13 Similarly, Internet Service
Providers and websites can collect consumer data as individuals use the
Internet.14 Retailers also directly track consumer behavior through the
use of store loyalty cards and checkout scanners.
This modem data collection serves many different functions. There
are some data aggregators that collect data only to resell it. Those firms,
often referred to as data brokers, gather data directly from consumers,
from other data aggregators, or from publicly available sources and then
sell access to those data to other firms.1 6 There are also some data aggre-
gators that collect and use customer data solely to better market their
own products. For example, a local grocery store might collect data
simply to better understand its customers and how they respond to cou-
pons or sales. One of the most significant data-collection practices in the
modem economy is done by businesses whose activities fall somewhere
between these two extremes. That type of data collection occurs as part
of a multi-sided platform and is the business model used by companies
like Google and Facebook.
13. Shalini Ramachandran & Suzanne Vranica, Comeast Seeks to Harness Trove of TV Data,
WALL STREET J. (Oct. 20, 2015, 5:30 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/comcast-seeks-to-harness-
trove-of-tv-data-1445333401; Time Warner Cable Subscriber Privacy Notice, TIME WARNER CABLE
(Apr. 2016), http://help.twcable.com/twcprivacynotice.html (indicating that the company collects
many types of data from subscribers, including "the programs, features and services" that they use).
14. LORI ANDREWS, I KNOW WHO YOU ARE AND I SAW WHAT You DID: SOCIAL NETWORKS
AND THE DEATH OF PRIVACY 19 (2012) (discussing a lawsuit against an intemet service provider
that allowed the monitoring of its subscriber's internet usage); PAYTON & CLAYPOOLE, supra note
12, at 189-91, 205-06; see also Solove, Digital Dossier, supra note 8, at 1098-1100 (discussing the
ramifications of the collection of personal information by, among others, cable companies and Inter-
net Service Providers on the government's ability to gather information); Privacy Policy,
NETZERO.NET, https://www.netzero.net/start/landing.do?page=www/legal/privacy#I (last updated
Nov. 12, 2014) (listing the vast amounts of information collected by the company including a user's
browser, software on computers and mobile devices, processor type, operating system, IP address,
websites visited, and location data); Website Privacy Policy, TIME WARNER CABLE,
https://www.timewarnercable.com/en/our-company/legal/privacy-policy.html (last updated Sept.
2012) (noting that the company collects information on the websites that customers visit, their IP
addresses, computer hardware and software, and "other Web usage activity and data," among other
classes of data).
15. BERNASEK & MONGAN, supra note 1, at 76-79; Timothy R. Graeff & Susan Harmon,
Collecting and Using Personal Data: Consumers' Awareness and Concerns, 19 J. CONSUMER
MARKETING 302, 304 (2002) (discussing the use of store loyalty cards to collect personal data).
16. FED. TRADE COMM'N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY 1-3 (May 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/data-
brokers-call-transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may-
2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf (discussing the data-broker industry). The data-broker industry
includes companies like Acxiom, which licenses business data (e.g., names, telephone numbers,
business classification code, location information, etc.) and personal residential data (e.g., telephone
numbers, names, addresses, mobile use, etc.). See Business Data, ACXIOM,
http://www.databyacxiom.com/business-data.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2016); Residential Data,
ACxioM, http://www.databyacxiom.com/residential-data.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2016).
2016] TRANSACTING IN DATA 151
The multi-sided platform is at the heart of the digital economy and
is defined by a business that serves two distinct but complementary cus-
tomer bases: (1) consumers who use a digital product, and (2) advertisers
who pay for access to those consumers.17 Google, for example, provides
a wide range of products to consumers, including its e-mail service, digi-
tal mapping software, online word-processing software, web browser,
search engine, social-media sites, and media offerings.18 Instead of
charging users a cash fee for access to those services, it collects data
from them, and it uses those data to sell targeted advertising.19 It thus
uses one side of its business model, the provision of digital goods to con-
sumers, to facilitate another side of its business model, the generation of
advertising income.
The importance of this business model is reflected in Google's fi-
nancial performance. In 2015, Google derived approximately 90% of its
revenue, over $67 billion, from advertising.20 This has led some to opine
that Google's product is actually its users and not its digital software
offerings.21 Google is not alone in this of course. Popular social-media
platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram all operate in the same
way. They offer "free" products but generate revenue by collecting and
monetizing users' information. Other websites, like many news websites,
operate similarly, with customer data and advertising as the revenue
drivers.22
17. See David S. Evans, Antitrust Issues Raised by the Emerging Global Internet Economy,
102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1987, 1994-96 (2008) (discussing the multisided platform).
18. Products, GOOGLE.COM, http://www.google.com/about/products/ (last visited Aug. 29.
2009).
19. Evans, supra note 17, at 1997-2002 (discussing Google's advertising revenue and busi-
ness model).
20. Alphabet Inc. & Google Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 11, 2016) [hereinafter
Google Annual Report],
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000165204416000012/googl 0-k2015.htm (re-
porting that approximately $67 billion of Google's $75 billion in revenue in 2015 resulted from
advertising). This has led some to the conclusion that individual users are Internet companies' prod-
ucts, rather than their customers.
21. PAYTON & CLAYPOOLE, supra note 12, at 33-34 ("In most instances, when you use free
services, what's really for sale is you and all the digital data nuggets you provide when you use the
service."); Scott Goodson, If You're Not Paying for It, You Become the Product, FORBES (Mar. 5,
2012, 12:34 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/marketshare/2012/03/05/if-youre-not-paying-for-it-
you-become-the-product/ ("If you're not paying for it; you are the product." (citation omitted));
Jonathan Zittrain, Meme Patrol. "When Something Online is Free, You're Not the Customer, You're
the Product," HARV. BLOGS: FUTURE OF THE INTERNET (Mar. 21, 2012),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/futureoftheintemet/2012/03/21/meme-patrol-when-something-online-is-
free-youre-not-the-customer-youre-the-product/ (exploring the source of this sentiment).
22. Some online newspapers have even started using so-called "survey walls" to collect data
as payment for access. Under the survey-wall method, a consumer is required to answer some basic
research questions before she is granted access to a website. Unsurprisingly, Google is at the fore-
front of this method of data acquisition. PAUL MCDONALD, MATT MOHEBBI & BRETT SLATKIN,
GOOGLE INC., COMPARING GOOGLE CONSUMER SURVEYS TO EXISTING PROBABILITY AND NON-
PROBABILITY BASED INTERNET SURVEYS 3,
https://www.google.com/insights/consumersurveys/static/consumer-surveyswhitepaper v2.pdf
(last visited Sept. 18, 2016). Google even competes for this business by touting its ability to ask
fewer questions of users because it can infer information about a respondent by using the respond-
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The data being collected by these firms are often classified into
three types-volunteered ata, observed data, and inferred data.23 Volun-
teered data are the data that consumers actively provide to data aggrega-
24tors. This can be their names, birthdays, addresses, places of work, and
the things that they "like." 25 Observed data include data that are gathered
based on a consumer's behaviors and activities and are collected without
the knowledge or special effort of the consumer.26 They are collected
through the use of various technological tools, like cookies, flash cook-
ies, browser fingerprinting, GPS tracking, deep packet inspection, and
history sniffing.2 7 Some companies are even tracking users through
smartphone applications that "listen" for ultrasonic pitches that are em-
bedded into television advertisements.28 Given the variety of these da-
ta-collection tools, there are many different types of observed data.
Those include information regarding what individuals purchase, the In-
ternet links that they click on, what they search for, the Internet browser
that they use, what music they listen to, how long they hover over arti-
cles or headlines, and the types of advertisements to which they re-
spond.29
The final category of data, inferred data, is comprised of data that
can be inferred based solely on a consumer's information profile.30 For
example, a data aggregator may be able to infer that an individual is
ent's IP address and a cookie that it places on the respondent's machine to track the respondent's
web history. Id.
23. WORLD EcoN. FORUM, PERSONAL DATA, supra note 3, at 7.
24. Id. at 14.
25. Of course, some data that users contribute are not necessarily personal at all. When a user
discloses a relationship or a meal with another person, for example, he or she discloses personal
information of that other person as well. We could thus question how effectively the law can be
tailored to allow individuals full control over their data or whether those data are really worthy of
protection at all. See Michael Birnhack, Reverse Engineering Informational Privacy Law, 15 YALE
J.L. & TECH. 24, 86 (2013) (recognizing that European Union (EU) privacy protections fail to take
this issue into account); Steven L. Willborn, Notice, Consent, and NAonconsent: Employee Privacy in
the Restatement, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 1423, 1423, 1425-27 (2015) (noting that some information
is simply not "private" and worthy of legal protection).
26. WORLD ECON. FORUM, PERSONAL DATA, supra note 3, at 14.
27. Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, To Track or "Do Not Track": Advancing Transparency
and Individual Control in Online Behavioral Advertising, 13 MINN. J.L. SCi. & TECH. 281, 288-89,
292-96, 298-99 (2012) (discussing these different online-tracking technologies).
28. Dan Goodin, Beware of Ads That Use Inaudible Sound to Link Your Phone, TV, Tablet,
and PC, ARS TECHNICA (Nov. 13, 2015, 11:00 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2015/11I/beware-of-ads-that-use-inaudible-sound-to-link-your-phone-tv-tablet-and-pc/.
29. See, e.g., WORLD ECON. FORUM, TRUST, supra note 3, at 18 ("Observed data is created as
a result of a transaction between an individual and an organization-location data from a mobile
phone, credit card transactions, purchase history at a retailer, etc."); Ryan Calo, Digital Market
Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1003-04 (2014) (providing a list of information that
websites can collect from consumers); Andrew Griffin, Facebook News Feed Algorithm to Track
How Long Users Spend Reading Stories, INDEPENDENT (June 15, 2015),
http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/facebook-news-feed-algorithm-to-
track-how-long-users-spend-reading-stories-10320715.html; Steve Rosenbush, Facebook Tests
Software to Track Your Cursor on Screen, WALL STREET J.: CIO J., (Oct. 30, 2013, 7:15 AM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2013/10/30/facebook-considers-vast-increase-in-data-collection/ (discuss-
ing the types of tracking that Facebook and other online websites perform).
30. WORLD ECON. FORUM, PERSONAL DATA, supra note 3, at 7, 14.
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pregnant based on her recent web searches and her in-store purchases.31
It may also be able to determine a person's credit worthiness based upon
whether he purchased felt pads for the bottom of the legs of his kitchen
32chairs.32 Inferred data thus represent a type of educated guess about an
individual.
The different types of data collected and their different uses raise a
number of questions regarding the personal-data market. These include
whether consumers understand the implications of that market and
whether consumers are being adequately compensated for their data.
These aspects of the personal-data market have been explored in the
technology and privacy literature as well as in the popular press. The
following Section provides some background on that literature with a
specific focus on how it has viewed the personal-data exchange and the
evolution of the personal-data economy.
B. Existing Analyses of the Personal-Data Market
The scope and importance of the personal-data market is well
known in the technology and privacy sectors. The World Economic Fo-
rum, for example, has a long-running project called "Rethinking Personal
Data,"33 which has resulted in a series of reports that evaluate the person-
al-data market and its impact on society.34 Those reports broadly recog-
nize that personal data has emerged as a new asset class that impacts our
entire society.35 They also recognize that personal data are becoming "a
primary currency of the digital economy."36 Other analysts repeat these
observations. Some have gone so far as to call data the "lifeblood of the
new economy,"3 and there is a widespread recognition that personal data
are being used as consideration for access to the digital products of to-
day's economy.3 Both academics39 and the popular preSS40 recognize
31. Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 16, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html? (discussing how retailers use
inferred data and relaying the remarkable story of the father who became aware that his high-school-
aged daughter was pregnant when Target sent her coupons for baby-related items).
32. WORLD ECON. FORUM, PERSONAL DATA, supra note 3, at 14; Strahilevitz, supra note 2,
at 2021.
33. WORLD ECON. FORUM, PERSONAL DATA, supra note 3.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 5.
36. Id. at 18.
37. PIERRE COLLIN & NICOLAS COLIN, TASK FORCE ON TAXATION OF THE DIGITAL
ECONOMY 33 (Jan. 2013) [hereinafter FRENCH REPORT],
http://www.hldataprotection.com/files/2013/06/Taxation-DigitalEconomy.pdf; EUROPEAN DATA
PROTECTION: COMING OF AGE 191 (Serge Gutwirth et al. eds., 2013); WORLD ECON. FORUM,
TRUST, supra note 3, at 7; GEORGE 0. M. YEE, PRIVACY PROTECTION MEASURES AND
TECHNOLOGIES IN BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: ASPECTS AND STANDARDS 173 (2012); Anupam
Chander & Uyhn P. L8, Data Nationalism, 64 EMORY L.J. 677, 721 (2015); Schwartz, supra note 5,
at 2069-70; Joe Callahan, Data: The Oil in Today's New Economy, FIRST INSIGHT: BLOG (July 17,
2015), http://www.firstinsight.com/blog/data-the-oil-in-todays-new-economy.
38. See, e.g., European Data Protection Supervisor, Preliminary Opinion on Privacy and
Competitiveness in the Age of Big Data 8-10 (Mar. 2014),
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultation/Opini
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that access to "free" digital products online is not free at all, but that con-
sumers pay for that access by relinquishing their data.4' Some analysts
even recognize that consumers are involved in a new type of barter ex-
change.42
The growth of this new type of personal-data exchange has led to
broad discussions regarding the inherent tradeoffs between maintaining
personal privacy and the benefits that individuals receive from disclosing
their personal information.4 3 Theoretically, consumers can make eco-
nomically rational decisions to exchange their data or their privacy for
access to digital products, and some scholars feel that government need
ons/2014/14-03-26_competitition law bigdataEN.pdf; Schwartz, supra note 5, at 2056-57;
Viviane Reding, Vice President, European Comm'n, Speech at the Innovation Conference Digital,
Life, Design: The EU Data Protection Reform 2012: Making Europe the Standard Setter for Modem
Data Protection Rules in the Digital Age (Jan. 22, 2012), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release SPEECH-12-26 en.htm ("Personal data is the currency of today's digital market."); Adam
Fisch, There's a New Currency in Town and It's Not the Malawian Kwacha or Azerbaiani Manat,
HUFFPOST TECH. U.K.: THE BLOG (Feb. 23, 2015, 11:04), http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/adam-
fisch/new-currencyb_6721866.html; David Zax, Is Personal Data the New Currency?, MIT TECH.
REV. (Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.technologyreview.com/view/426235/is-personal-data-the-new-
currency/.
39. Hoofnagle & Whittington, supra note 4, at 608 (noting that "free" online services "carry a
hidden charge: the forfeit of one's personal information"); Juan Pablo Carrascal et al., Your Brows-
ing Behavior for a Big Mac: Economics of Personal Information Online 189 (May 13-17, 2013)
(research paper prepared for the Twenty-Second International World Wide Web Conference),
http://www20l3.wwwconference.org/proceedings/pl89.pdf; Christopher Riederer et al., For Sale:
Your Data by: You (Nov. 14-15, 2011) (research paper prepared for the Tenth ACM Workshop Hot
Topics in Networks (HotNets-X)), http://www.cs.columbia.edu/-mani/hotnetsX-final85.pdf.
40. For example, when Microsoft released Windows 10 in mid-2015, it provided the software
to existing Windows customers without charge. Commentators had no trouble recognizing that the
software was not actually free, but that consumers were paying for this new software with their data.
Geoffrey A. Fowler, Windows 10 Isn't Spyware but It Wants Your Data, WALL STREET J. (Aug. 5,
2015, 8:00 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/personal-technology/2015/08/05/windows-10-isnt-spyware-
but-it-wants-your-data/; Laurie Segall, Your Private Data Pays for 'Free' Facebook and Google,
CNN MONEY (Jan. 28, 2011, 6:56 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2011/01/28/technology/googledataprivacy da /; Natasha Singer, Sharing
Data, but Not Happily, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/05/technology/consumers-conflicted-over-data-mining-policies-
report-finds.html; Ben Wright, Do You Want Free Facebook or a Say in Where Your Personal Data




41. A recent Pew Research Center study found that consumers did seem to understand that
they were trading data for benefits. LEE RAINIE & MAEVE DUGGAN, PEW RESEARCH CTR., PRIVACY
AND INFORMATION SHARING 6-7 (2016), http://www.pewintemet.org/2016/01/14/2016/Privacy-and-
Information-Sharing/.
42. See sources cited supra note 5.
43. See Laura Brandimarte & Alessandro Acquisti, The Economics of Privacy, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 547 (Martin Peitz & Joel Waldfogel eds., 2012)
(discussing the "economics of privacy"); JOSEPH TUROW, MICHAEL HENNESSY & NORA DRAPER,
ANNENBERG SCH. FOR COMMC'N UNIV. OF PA., THE TRADEOFF FALLACY 4-9 (2015),
https://www.asc.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/TradeoffFallacyl.pdf; Ryan Calo, Privacy and Mar-
kets: A Love Story, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 649, 658 (2015); Jules Polonetsky & Omer Tene,
Privacy and Big Data: Making Ends Meet, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 25, 26 (2013) ("Finding the
right balance between privacy risks and big data rewards may very well be the biggest public policy
challenge of our time.").
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not interfere to mandate particular data-protection practices." Others,
however, feel that individuals are not able to fully participate in the mar-
ket for their data. They argue that informational asymmetries, behavioral
biases, and structural problems in the data market prevent that market
from functioning effectively.45
Recent research tends to suggest hat consumers are indeed unhappy
with how their personal data are being collected and utilized.46 Consum-
ers have continued to allow that collection and use, however, because
they have felt that they had to do so if they wanted to be fully engaged
members of today's society.47 That is beginning to change though, and
there are significant efforts being directed toward modifying how Inter-
net commerce is conducted. The Berkman Klein Center for Internet &
Society at Harvard, for example, runs a project named ProjectVRM.4
That project focuses on the concept of vendor relationship management
(VRM) which is focused on making consumers empowered economic
actors with respect to their data.49 The project urges the development of
technology that allows individuals to more fully control their own data
and how others use those data.5 0 The focus is on giving consumers con-
trol of their relationships with vendors instead of simply being economic
units for vendors to capture.5 1 Consumers could do this if they could col-
lect and control their own data, if they had the ability to selectively share
those data, or if they could control the conditions under which others
44. See Brandimarte & Acquisti, supra note 43, at 552-55; Calo, supra note 43, at 655-57
(discussing these propositions).
45. See Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, Privacy Attitudes and Privacy Behavior, in
THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION SECURITY 165, 165-66 (L. Jean Camp & Stephen Lewis eds.,
2004); Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, What Can Behavioral Economics Teach Us About
Privacy?, in DIGITAL PRIVACY 363, 364-65 (Alessandro Acquisti et al. eds., 2008); Brandimarte &
Acquisti, supra note 43, at 555-57, 564; Calo, supra note 29, at 1013-15; Calo, supra note 43, at
650-51; A. Michael Froomkin, Regulating Mass Surveillance as Privacy Pollution: Learning from
Environmental Impact Statements, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1713, 1728-37 (2015); Daniel J. Solove,
Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1879, 1880-
81(2013).
46. MARY MADDEN, PEW RESEARCH CTR., PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF PRIVACY AND SECURITY
IN THE POST-SNOWDEN ERA (2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/11/12/public-privacy-
perceptions/; TUROW, HENNESSY & DRAPER, supra note 43, at 3.
47. TUROW, HENNESSY & DRAPER, supra note 43, at 4 ("[T]he larger percentages of people in
the population who are resigned compared to people who believe in . .. tradeoffs . . . indicate that in
the real world people who [exchange] their data [for benefits] are more likely to do it while resigned
rather than as the result of cost-benefit analysis."); see also Solove, Digital Dossiers, supra note 8, at
1158 (concluding that people would have to live "as Information Age hermits, without credit cards,
banks, Internet service, phones and television" if they did not want to share their information with
third parties).
48. Project VRM, BERKMAN KLEIN CTR., https://cyber.law.harvard.edu/research/projectvrm
(last updated July 5, 2016).
49. Id. (vendor relationship management is in contrast to "customer relationship manage-
ment," which focuses on how vendors can best capture consumers).
50. See PROJECT VRM, http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/projectvrm/MainPage (last updated
Sept. 4, 2016).
51. DOC SEARLS, THE INTENTION ECONOMY: WHEN CUSTOMERS TAKE CHARGE 164-65
(2012).
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could use their data.52 A number of digital products currently incorporate
these VRM concepts.
One specific VRM-like proposal is to create cash markets in which
individuals can sell their personal data. For example, noted author and
computer scientist Jaron Lanier has suggested a world where individuals
receive micro-payments each time their data are used.54 Others focus on
the development of personal-data banks or vaults where consumers store
and sell access to their data.5 Scholars have explored this type of market
development by experimenting with cash markets for data in laboratory
experiments.56 Others have created, or are creating, firms that actually
provide that service.57 Some businesses also have developed platforms
that provide compensation for data without using the data-bank model.
The now-defunct social-media platform "tsu," for example, shared its
advertising revenue with users based on their activities on the site.5 A
similar platform, Bonzo Me, pays users 80% of the advertising revenue
that is derived from their posts.
59
Those changes to the data economy are being explored as responses
to generalized concerns regarding personal privacy, but they might also
be compelled due to individuals' increased use of technology that blocks
tracking and online advertising. Those actions directly undercut the
advertising side of the multi-sided business model and could require that
businesses move towards a cash-subscription model or a model that al-
52. Id
53. VRM Development Work, PROJECT VRM,
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/projectvrm/VRMDevelopment Work (last updated Oct. 4, 2016).
54. JARON LANIER, WHO OWNS THE FUTURE 317 (2013).
55. See Kenneth C. Laudon, Markets and Privacy, COMM. ACM, Sept. 1996, at 92, 99-100;
Tom Simonite, Sell Your Personal Data for $8 a Month, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 12, 2014),
http://www.technologyreview.com/news/52462 1/sell-your-personal-data-for-8-a-month/.
56. See Christina Aperjis & Bernardo A. Huberman, A Market for Unbiased Private Data:
Paying Individuals According to Their Privacy Attitudes, FIRST MONDAY (May 2012),
http://journals.uic.edu/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/4013/3 2 0 9#pl; Riederer et. al., supra note 39,
at 1; Jacopo Staiano et al., Money Walks: A Human-Centric Study on the Economics of Personal
Mobile Data I (Sept. 13-17, 2014) (research paper prepared for the 2014 ACM International Joint
Conference on Pervasive and Ubiquitous Computing (UbiComp 2014)),
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1407.0566.pdf.
57. Consumers Could License Their Data, WARC (Jan. 28, 2016),
http://www.warc.com/LatestNews/News/Consumerscould-license-their-data.news?ID=361 11;
Zax, supra note 38. Companies that offer this service include DATACOUP, https://datacoup.com (last
visited Oct. 16, 2016), and PERSONAL BLACKBox, http://pbb.me/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2016).
58. TSO, https://www.tsu.co/about (last visited Jan. 27, 2016).
59. What Can You Do on BonzoMe?, BONZO ME (Sept. 17, 2014), http://bonzome.com/what-
can-you-do-on-bonzome/.
60. See PAGEFAIR & ADOBE, THE COST OF AD BLOCKING: 2015 AD BLOCKING REPORT
(2015), https://downloads.pagefair.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/2015_report-
the cost of ad blocking.pdf; Ted McConnell,. Don't Let Viewers Renege on the Social Contract,
MEDIAPOST (Sept. 9, 2015, 12:17 AM),
http://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/257938/dont-let-viewers-renege-on-the-social-
contract.html (discussing ways to discourage ad-blocking); With Ad Blocking Use on the Rise, What




lows users to take more control of their data. Regardless of the approach
taken, though, individuals will have to pay for their desired digital prod-
ucts one way or another. Along these lines, some have advocated for
cash-subscription options for websites, including Facebook.6 1 Those in-
dividuals would rather pay with cash than with their data. One research
firm even predicted that 2016 would be a "tipping point," with more
companies offering paid, ad-free subscription models.62
In sum, it is clear that the personal-data market is of great economic
importance and that it raises significant issues regarding personal priva-
cy. The market is receiving considerable attention by consumers, privacy
scholars, and technologists. It has thus far, however, gone largely unno-
ticed by our tax system and by our tax scholars. Part II of this Article
remedies that omission.
II. PERSONAL-DATA TAXATION
The personal-data market is a critical part of today's economy, but
that market has largely escaped the attention of the tax community. The
only real tax analysis of the personal-data market has been done by the
international tax community in the context of reports regarding the taxa-
tion of the digital economy more broadly. This Section explores that
analysis and discusses how transactions in data should be treated for U.S.
tax purposes. The latter discussion includes analyses of (1) the theoreti-
cal tax consequences to individual consumers as data providers; (2) the
theoretical tax consequences to businesses as data aggregators; and
(3) the pragmatic factors that will impede the taxation of personal-data
transactions as they occur today.63
A. The Personal-Data Market, the Digital Economy, and Global Taxa-
tion
The modern economy presents many challenges for our global tax
systems. Multi-national firms are able to use complex corporate struc-
tures and international tax rules to direct their profits into jurisdictions
61. See Calo, supra note 29, at 1047-48 (considering this option for consumer-protection
reasons); Zeynep Tufekci, Mark Zuckerberg, Let Me Pay for Facebook, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/04/opinion/zeynep-tufekci-mark-zuckerberg-let-me-pay-for-
facebook.html; Dear Software Companies, Please Let Me Pay You Money, CREATIVE REALIST (Dec.
18, 2012), http://www.creativerealist.com/post/38234666233/dear-software-companies-please-let-
me-pay-you; Mark Schaefer, Dear Facebook. Please Let Me Pay You., BUSINESSGROw.COM,
http://www.businessesgrow.com/2013/02/07/dear-facebook-please-let-me-pay-you/ (last visited
Sept. 3, 2016).
62. Harriet Taylor, Privacy Will Hit Tipping Point in 2016, CNBC (Nov. 9, 2015, 8:35 AM),
http://www.cnbc.com/2015/11/09/privacy-will-hit-tipping-point-in-2016.html (discussing a privacy
report issued by Forrester Research).
63. The tax analysis of this article presumes that data aggregators are subject to corporate
income tax and that data providers are individuals subject to the personal income tax. This is done
for the purpose of simplicity only.
2016] 157
158 DENVER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1
with low or no tax." This has motivated significant tax scholarship that
analyzes how to best modify our international tax rules to ensure that
multi-national firms' profits are taxed at some desired level.65 The use of
personal data in the modem economy adds to the general challenges fac-
ing global taxation because it gives firms another way to build value that
is difficult to assign to a particular activity or jurisdiction. For this rea-
son, the commercialization of personal data has been recognized in two
recent reports that more generally analyze the global tax issues created
by the digital economy-a report issued by the Organization for Eco-
nomic Co-Operation and Development in 2015 (the OECD Report)66 and
an earlier 2013 report commissioned by the French government (the
French Report).67 Both of those Reports recognize that personal-data
transactions are a key component of the digital economy and address the
difficulty of determining how those transactions should be characterized
for tax purposes.68
The OECD Report very briefly does the latter and notes that those
transactions could be seen either as taxable barter transactions or as "free
goods" transactions.69 The Report does not detail the tax consequences of
those constructs or analyze whether one is preferred over the other.70
Instead, the Report suggests that the characterization issue is not of great
importance because the value that personal-data transactions create will
64. See Chris William Sanchirico, As American as Apple Inc.: International Tax and Owner-
ship Nationality, 68 TAX L. REV. 207, 207-10 (2015) (referencing the general scholarship and de-
bate regarding U.S. corporate tax avoidance). See generally JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., TAX HAVENS: INTERNATIONAL TAX AVOIDANCE AND EVASION 9-10 (2015),
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40623.pdf; J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E.
Shay, Getting Serious About Cross-Border Earnings Stripping: Establishing an Analytical Frame-
work, 93 N.C. L. REV. 673, 675 (2015); Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV.
699, 701-02 (2011).
65. , See generally ARTHUR COCKFIELD ET AL., TAXING GLOBAL DIGITAL COMMERCE (3d rev.
ed. 2013) (broadly evaluating the impact of the digital economy on global tax systems); Fleming,
Peroni & Shay, supra note 64; Kleinbard, supra note 64; Edward D. Kleinbard, The Lessons of
Stateless Income, 65 TAX L. REV. 99 (2011).
66. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE
DIGITAL ECONOMY, ACTION 1: 2015 FINAL REPORT (2015) [hereinafter OECD REPORT],
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/addressing-the-tax-challenges-of-the-digital-economy-action-
1-2015-final-report 9789264241046-en. The OECD Report was issued as part of its Base Erosion
and Profits Shifting Project that it initiated in 2013. Id. at 3. That project included a 15-point Action
Plan to "ensure that profits are taxed where economic activities take place and value is created." Id.
Action I of that Action Plan called for research into ways to "address the tax challenges of the
digital economy." Id. at 11. One outcome of that call was the publication of the 285-page OECD
Report. See generally id That report discusses much more than just personal data of course. It
broadly discusses the challenges that the digital economy, including the use of personal data in that
economy, presents with respect to both direct taxes like income taxes, and to indirect taxes like
consumption taxes. See generally id.
67. In 2012, the French government commissioned a comprehensive report on the impacts of
the digital economy on that country's tax system. The resulting report, the French Report, was issued
in January 2013, and specifically identified personal data as the "common denominator" and the
"core of value creation" in the digital economy. FRENCH REPORT, supra note 37, at 35.
68. See generally id.; OECD REPORT, supra note 66.
69. OECD REPORT, supra note 66, at 104.
70. See id.
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ultimately be taxed when data aggregators convert it into advertising
income.7 1 For reasons discussed below, this is not a satisfactory way of
handling the issue.72
The French Report provides a relatively more robust analysis. It de-
tails how the modem economy has been built on the "regular and sys-
tematic monitoring" of consumers who are not being provided with any
monetary payment for the resulting data.73 It also reasons that those data
are "free or nearly free" to data aggregators because the data are collect-
ed as a "positive extemalit[y]" of an online application that can be pro-
vided by those firms at a near-zero marginal cost.74 The Report's focus
on these factors results in its adoption of a "free-labour construct" under
which consumers are treated as unpaid laborers-and not as beneficiaries
of a market exchange.75 This is not to say that the Report does not con-
sider other potential tax constructs. It does.76 Among the models consid-
ered are those that would incorporate some sort of taxable-exchange the-
ory, but the Report concluded that none of those constructs fit the per-
sonal-data exchange in a workable way.77 The Report did also specifical-
ly raise the question of whether individual users would have tax conse-
quences under a market-exchange theory if one took that construct to the
"extreme."78 That possibility was dismissed quickly even though the
Report did recognize that individual consumers do get access to online
applications in exchange for their data.79
The adoption of the free-labor model seems to be best explained by
the motivation for the Report. The authors of the Report were focused on
determining how France could best respond to the new economy and
multi-national firms' aggressive tax planning.80 They were not asked to
find a model that best reflected economic reality. It is thus not surprising
that the authors would adopt a model that narrowed the inquiry to data
aggregators and that ignored the tax consequences to consumers. 8 In
doing so, however, the Report was far more limited in scope than this
Article is intended to be, and we can fairly question the extent to which
its analysis is helpful to that goal.
71. Id.
72. See infra Section I.A. 1.
73. FRENCH REPORT, supra note 37, at 2.
74. Id. at 49.
75. Id. at 2, 49-54, 79, 102, 114-16.
76. Id. at 79-80.
77. Id. at 79-84.
78. Id. at 116. This was done in the span of one sentence in the text and in one sentence in a
footnote. Id.
79. Id. at 81. This, of course, creates an inconsistency. The report posits that consumers are
not being paid for their data, that companies are not being paid for their digital products, but that
both are receiving something valuable from the other. See generally id
80. Id. at 1-3.
81. Id. at 2-3.
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Properly categorizing personal-data transactions requires us to rec-
ognize that consumers actually do receive compensation for their data.
They generally do not receive cash, but they benefit immensely in other
ways. The wide range of "free" digital products that are available today
is staggering. We live in a world where all of humanity's accumulated
information-and Pok6mon Go-is readily available at a moment's no-
tice. We pay for hardware to access that information, but the information
and entertainment is provided without a cash fee. Consumers are undeni-
ably getting something in return for their data. In fact, economists have
valued the consumer welfare gains from "free" online products at ap-
proximately $100 billion per year in the U.S. alone.82 To claim that con-
sumers are getting nothing from the deal is thus inaccurate.83
It is equally inaccurate to say that data aggregators are getting free
labor from consumers. Although Google does get each additional user's
data for a very low cost, its near-zero marginal cost is a function of
providing a digital product, not of the personal-data market. Digital
goods are largely non-rivalrous; they can be replicated infinitely, at low
cost, and without any drain on the primary resource.84 The marginal cost
of selling software on a CD-ROM includes the cost of a disk, manufac-
turing time, and packaging. The marginal cost of providing another per-
son access to online software involves some incremental burden on serv-
er space, but that is it. Having a near-zero marginal cost, though, does
not mean that digital goods have no cost. Firms spend significant sums
to develop products that consumers will use repeatedly.86 It is critical that
82. Erik Brynjolfsson & Joo Hee Oh, The Attention Economy: Measuring the Value of Free
Digital Services on the Internet 3 (Dec. 16-19, 2012) (research paper prepared for the Thirty-Third
International Conference on Information Systems),
http://aisel.aisnet.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1 045&context-icis2012.
83. This is, of course, not to say that consumers are being adequately compensated for their
data, just that they are being compensated in some amount. See supra notes 44-45 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the challenges preventing a perfectly functioning market for personal data).
84. COCKFIELD ET AL., supra note 65, at 30; Hoofnagle & Whittington, supra note 4, at 620-
22; Samuelson, supra note 6, at 1138. The nonrivalrous nature of digital goods is consistent with the
nonrivalrous nature of intellectual property and data. See Mark A. Hall, Property, Privacy, and the
Pursuit of Interconnected Electronic Medical Records, 95 IowA L. REV. 631, 661 (2010) ("Infor-
mation by its nature is nonrivalrous, meaning it can be used by many people at once without deple-
tion."); Eric E. Johnson, The Economics and Sociality of Sharing Intellectual Property Rights, 94
B.U. L. REV. 1935, 1940-42 (2014) (describing the nonrivalrous nature of intellectual property);
Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REv. 1031, 1050-51
(2005) ("Information is what economists call a pure 'public good,' which means both that its con-
sumption is nonrivalrous-my use of an idea does not impose any direct cost on you-and that it is
not something from which others can easily be excluded."); see also Mark A. Lemley, IP in a World
Without Scarcity, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 460, 466-71 (2015) (discussing the impact of technology on
scarcity).
85. COCKFIELD ET AL., supra note 65, at 29-30 (noting that information goods do not have
fixed, marginal costs and that the fixed costs can be "quite high"); Hoofnagle & Whittington, supra
note 4, at 622-24.
86. Google Annual Report, supra note 20 (revealing that Google and its parent company spent
over $16 billion on research and development in 2015); see also Facebook, Annual Report (Form
10-K) (Jan. 28, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/000132680116000043/fb-
12312015xlOk.htm (revealing that Facebook had a "cost of revenue" of almost $2.9 billion in 2015
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a business using a multi-sided platform provide users "with a fluid, reas-
suring and stimulating experience."8 Absent those factors, its flow of
data ceases and its business will fail. It is therefore incorrect to claim that
data aggregators receive data for free. They might have great economies
of scale, but they do pay for their data. The free-labor construct is thus
inappropriate, at least for data aggregators who utilize a multi-sided
business model.
The sum of this analysis is that the utilization of a free-labor model
in international tax analyses should not guide how we think about per-
sonal-data transactions for domestic tax purposes. The actual functioning
of the personal-data market supports the adoption of a market-exchange
model under which we recognize that firms acquire data by providing
consumers with access to desirable digital products and that consumers
use their data to acquire access to those products.89
and also spent nearly $5 billion on research and development; Facebook's cost of revenue "consists
primarily of expenses associated with the delivery and distribution of [its] products").
87. FRENCH REPORT, supra note 37, at 53 (such a service "makes it possible to infiltrate the
data-to-day activities and even the private life of individuals"); Nadezhda Purtova, The Illusion of
Personal Data as No One's Property, 7 LAW INNOVATION & TECH. 83, 107 (2015).
88. The free-labor construct might be more apt for data aggregation that occurs in connection
with other types of exchanges. A consumer purchasing internet or cable television access, for exam-
ple, will pay a cash subscription charge, but he or she will also likely be monitored and will transfer
personal data to the service provider as he or she uses its product. ANDREWS, supra note 14, at 19
(discussing a lawsuit against an intermet service provider that allowed the monitoring of its subscrib-
ers' intemet usage); PAYTON & CLAYPOOLE, supra note 12, at 189-91; Ramachandran & Vranica,
supra note 13. In this situation, the traditional commercial exchange might incorporate the exchange
of data into the cash price charged. It is also possible, however, that the data exchange might be
unknown to the consumer and that the consumer might not be able to understand or be able to extract
the value of the data that he or she is transferring. This would be consistent with scholarship showing
that consumers are poorly informed participants in the data market, are often unaware that hey are
market participants at all, or are simply resigned to providing their data. See supra notes 43-47 and
accompanying text; see also Nathan Newman, The Costs of Lost Privacy: Consumer Harm and
Rising Economic Inequality in the Age of Google, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 849, 860-63 (2014)
(discussing the many forces working against a competitive market for personal data). We thus might
be more comfortable with the free-labor construct in the context of exchanges where consumers are
paying a cash price for their benefit of choice.
89. This article has thus far focused on individuals as exchanging their personal data for
access to digital goods, but it is not necessarily clear that this characterization is accurate. To start, it
is not clear that personal data is something that can be owned or that such ownership is transferable.
The proper characterization of data has been discussed for years in the property and privacy litera-
ture, and some advocate for a property construct for personal data, but those data do not necessarily
fall within our classical conception of property. They certainly are not currently protected as proper-
ty. See, e.g., BERNASEK & MONGAN, supra note 1, at 194-200; Cohen, supra note 6, at 1374-77;
Samuelson, supra note 6, at 1130-52; Schwartz, supra note 5, at 2094-2116; Solove, Digital Dossi-
ers, supra note 8, at 1112-15. Data also share some qualities with goods and some qualities with
services. Like goods they can be stored and delivered from a location other than where they are
produced. Like services, however, they are intangible. MICHAEL MANDEL, PROGRESSIVE POLICY
INST., BEYOND GOODS AND SERVICES: THE (UNMEASURED) RISE OF THE DATA-DRIVEN ECONOMY
1-2 (2012), http://www.progressivepolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/10.2012-
MandelBeyond-Goods-and-ServicesThe-Unmeasured-Rise-of-the-Data-Driven-Economypdf.
The uncertainties regarding how to characterize data make it a bit uneasy to accept a construct under
which individuals are transferring those data as payment for access to digital goods.
The type of data involved might also further undermine a construct under which consum-
ers are deemed to be selling their data. Volunteered data, for example, certainly look like something
that an individual transfers to an aggregator. Those data represent information held by the individual
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B. The Personal-Data Market and Domestic Taxation
1. Personal-Data Transactions and the Income Tax
Determining whether a particular event results in taxable income
begins with Internal Revenue Code (the Code) § 61, which provides that
gross income includes "all income."90 The Supreme Court has noted that
Congress intended to "exert . . . the full measure of its taxing power" in
enacting that definition and has interpreted it to mean that income in-
cludes all "accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the
taxpayers have complete dominion."91 That is a very broad formulation,92
and the fact that money does not exchange hands is not dispositive.9 3
Indeed, barter transactions are clearly taxable under the Code.94 Our in-
come tax laws treat a party to such an exchange as if she had traded her
goods or services for cash and then used those funds to purchase the
good or service from the other party to the exchange. 95 The key to under-
standing and evaluating the tax consequences of a barter transaction is to
break it into its component parts. For example, a lawyer who trades her
and purposefully given to the aggregator. Observed ata, on the other hand, look much different.
Those data are captured through the effort of the aggregator and may have been previously unknown
to the individual-the speed at which they type in a comments section or their responses to behav-
ioral prompts for example. The individual as data transferor looks less apt on those facts. They look
much more like a service provider.
This characterization issue is interesting in the abstract but becomes important only if one
determines that individuals have income from engaging in personal-data transactions. That issue is
considered in depth below. See infra Section IIB. 1.
90. 26 U.S.C. § 61(a) (2012). "Gross income" ultimately becomes "taxable income" after the
application of deductions and personal exemptions. 26 U.S.C. § 63 (2012). The tax analysis of this
Article presumes that data aggregators are subject to corporate income tax and that data providers
are individuals subject to the personal income tax. This is done for simplicity only.
91. Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429-31 (1955). State income taxes gener-
ally defer to the Code in determining a taxpayer's income that is subject to tax. See 2 JEROME R.
HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION ¶ 20.02 (3d ed. 2000). This Section will
therefore focus on the federal income-tax laws, but taxpayers with federal taxable income would
likely have state income-tax consequences as well, to the extent that they were subject to such a tax.
92. There is an academic debate about whether the § 61 formulation provides a rule or a
standard. See Alice G. Abreu & Richard K. Greenstein, Defining Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 295,
330 (2011) [hereinafter Abreu & Greenstein, Defining Income]; Alice G. Abreu & Richard K.
Greenstein, It's Not a Rule: A Better Way to Understand the Definition ofIncome, 13 FLA. TAX REV.
101, 101-02 (2012); Alice G. Abreu & Richard K. Greenstein, The Rule of Law as a Law of Stand-
ards: Interpreting the Internal Revenue Code, 64 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 53, 55 (2015); Lawrence
Zelenak, Custom and the Rule of Law in the Administration of the Income Tax, 62 DUKE L.J. 829,
829-30 (2012). This debate and its implications for the taxation of personal-data transactions will be
discussed in greater detail below with respect to the taxation of data providers under the barter-
exchange model. See infra Section IIB..1.
93. Section 1031 of the Internal Revenue Code does allow for the deferral of gain on certain
exchanges of property, but multiple conditions must be met for that deferral provision to apply. See
26 U.S.C. § 1031 (2012).
94. See 26 U.S.C. § 83(a), (b) (2012) (providing rules for the inclusion in gross income of
gains from the receipt of property in exchange for services); Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(1) (as amended
in 2003) (providing that the fair market value of property or services received in exchange for ser-
vices is included in gross income); Rev. Rul. 79-24, 1979-1 C.B. 60. See generally Robert 1. Keller,
The Taxation of Barter Transactions, 67 MINN. L. REV. 441 (1982) (broadly discussing the taxation
of barter exchanges).
95. Rev. Rul. 79-24, 1979-1 C.B. 60.
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legal services for painting services is treated as if she had provided legal
services for a cash fee and then used that income to purchase the painting
services.96 Her tax consequences from engaging in the barter are the
same as if she had engaged in those two separate transactions.
This barter model applies easily to the personal-data transactions of
today's economy. Under a market-exchange model, data aggregators sell
access to their digital products in exchange for personal data, and con-
sumers sell their data in exchange for access to digital products. No cash
is exchanged in those transactions, but each side transfers something of
value to the other. As a result, our tax laws dictate that data providers
should report income on the sale of their data and that data aggregators
should report income on the sale of access to their digital products. The
occurrence of a taxable event is relatively clear as a conceptual matter.
This basic analysis is not meant to suggest that he tax analysis is
that limited. Many other considerations come into play, both for data
providers and for data aggregators, and the following Parts look more
closely at the particular issues that arise on each side of the exchange.
a. Income Tax, Data Providers, and the Market-Exchange
Model
The practical impact of the conclusions above should not be lost on
readers. Treating personal-data transactions as barter exchanges means
that individuals who post something on Facebook or who use Gmail are
engaged in taxable transactions. It means that each entry into a search
engine is a taxable sale of data and a taxable sale of access to that digital
product. That result may be surprising at first, but should not be particu-
larly provocative to those familiar with economic or tax analyses. Indi-
vidual personal-data exchanges are the equivalent of two separate market
transactions, and we would absolutely tax them if they occurred in those
two steps. For example, Facebook could run two independent business-
es-one that paid individuals to take part in experiments and another that
sold access to its social-media platform. If it ran those two distinct busi-
nesses, we would have no trouble saying that individuals who received
compensation for participating in the experiments had taxable income.97
The analysis should be no different when the steps are combined and
individual users are paid for their data with direct access to the website.
This conclusion is at the heart of the entire barter-exchange doc-
trine. Exchanges of value have tax consequences regardless of whether
96. Id.; Keller, supra note 94, at 443 (discussing the "two-payment approach" to characteriz-
ing barter transactions).
97. See O'Connor v. Comm'r, 104 T.C.M. (CCH) 571 (2012) (finding that compensation
received for participating in a medical research study was includable in the recipient's gross income
under Code § 61).
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the exchange is facilitated by currency.98 Any other rule would make tax
avoidance too simple. Service providers, whether employees or inde-
pendent contractors, could just demand payments of tax-free, in-kind
benefits rather than of taxable cash compensation. That result would
clearly be problematic-except as an intended subsidy.
The conclusion that individuals generate income from personal-data
barters is straightforward once one adopts the market-exchange model.
More broadly, however, that conclusion is the same under general tax
principles, even if one does not feel comfortable with using the barter-
exchange characterization.99 Under a more general analysis, the basic
question is still whether an individual consumer who receives access to a
"free" digital product has received an "accession to wealth" in the Glen-
shaw Glass sense. 1 0 As noted above, that formulation appears incredibly
broad, and there is some resulting discussion regarding whether "in-
come" under the Tax Code is as broad as an economic concept of income
or whether pragmatic factors result in a tax definition of "income" that is
more narrow.
Under a broad, economic theory of income, though, the ability to
access Google Docs or Facebook is a benefit that is clearly realized
without the taxpayer having paid for its value in cash. If the benefit re-
ceived were a copy of Microsoft Word, we would have no problem iden-
tifying the fact of a taxable event. The answer should be no different, as a
conceptual matter, simply because the benefit is provided digitally. A
consumer who receives a free digital product is in an economically supe-
rior position to one who has to pay cash for that same product.
This conclusion is fine as a normative matter, but our positive law
does provide a number of exclusions from gross income for gains that
constitute income in the economic sense. Gifts, for example, are acces-
sions to wealth in the broad sense, but they are not taxed.'0 ' Certain
fringe benefits are treated the same way.1 02 Indeed, the statutory exclu-
98. This is clear as an abstract normative matter, but the receipt of in-kind benefits has always
presented troubles for discussions of how to define and measure income. See HENRY C. SIMONS,
PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 53
(1938).
99. Some might, for example, contest that individuals can enter into a taxable exchange if
they are unaware that it is occurring or if they did not actually possess the information being bar-
tered. Some may just reject the idea that individuals are engaged in a market transaction out of hand.
100. Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
101. 26 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). This statutory exclusion might come to mind for certain read-
ers that are not intimately familiar with the tax laws. One could argue that companies are effectively
making a gift to users when they give them access to their products without charge. For tax purpos-
es, though, gifts are transfers made with "detached and disinterested generosity," and the intent of
the donor controls in making that determination. Comm'r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960)
(citing Comm'r v. Lo Bue, 351 U.S. 243, 246 (1956)). A transfer of access to a digital product in
exchange for data is not a gift under that standard. The transferor of access to the product is doing so
out of self-interest.
102. 26 U.S.C. §§ 119, 132 (2012). Courts have also allowed certain non-statutory exclusions
from gross income that are more consistent with a standard-based conception of § 61. In United
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sion for de minimis fringe benefits under Code § 132 appears to be a
close fit for the gains derived by individuals in personal-data transac-
tions. 103
The de-minimis exclusion applies to "any property or service the
value of which is . .. so small as to make accounting for it unreasonable
or administratively impracticable."'4 That standard takes into account
the frequency with which the benefit is provided.05 As a result, a single
meal might have de minimis value, but might fail to be de minimis if pro-
vided every day.1 06 That construct could apply well to consumer gains
from data transfers because of the values involved and the difficulties
inherent in tracking those exchanges. The value of a single visit to Pin-
terest or WebMD hardly seems large enough to make accounting for it
reasonable or practicable. The analysis is different, of course, for users
who log into their Gmail accounts daily or who store a large number of
photographs on Facebook's servers. Nonetheless, some might still feel
that the de minimis exemption should apply in those situations because of
the values and administrative difficulties that would be involved with
taxing the resulting gains.
The de minimis construct is certainly appealing, but it is not perfect-
ly applicable to personal-data barters. First, there are qualitative differ-
ences between the typical de minimis fringe benefit and personal-data
gains. The former are generally provided either (1) as a side benefit of an
existing relationship (as in the case of coffee in an employer's break
States v. Gotcher, for example, the Fifth Circuit evaluated a case in which a married couple received
a free trip to Germany. 401 F.2d 118, 119 (5th Cir. 1968). The cost of that trip was paid by Mr.
Gotcher's employer and by the Volkswagen Company, which was attempting to induce him into
investing in a Volkswagen dealership. Id. at 119-23. The court determined that no statutory exclu-
sion from gross income applied, but that the receipt of the trip was not taxable regardless. Id. at 124.
The court reasoned that the benefit was not taxable because Volkswagen provided the trip for its
own benefit and not to personally benefit Mr. Gotcher. Id at 123-24. The court also relied on the
fact that the benefit was business in nature-Mr. Gotcher's activities were oriented around business
matters, not pleasure. Id. at 122. The court also found it compelling that Mr. Gotcher did not have a
choice to go on the trip. Id. at 123.
One could argue that taxpayers engaged in personal-data barters hould not have income
under a Gotcher-like analysis. The providers of digital products do so to benefit themselves and not
their users. The most significant problem with applying Gotcher, however, is that the benefits that
individuals receive in personal-data barters are not like the highly controlled business trip that Mr.
Gotcher received. They are inherently personal and controlled by those individuals. See Abreu &
Greenstein, Defining Income, supra note 92, at 311-12 (critiquing Gotcher as "not withstand[ing]
rigorous analysis" and thus providing more reasons why its analysis should not be extended to per-
sonal-data transactions). Facebook does not guide users through its social media site to show off its
capabilities. Consumers use that product at their leisure and as they wish to derive some personal
benefit. For these reasons, a Gotcher-like analysis should not result in the conclusion that personal-
data gains are not includable in a taxpayer's gross income even though that case did apply an extra-
statutory exclusion from gross income. See Gotcher, 401 F.2d at 123-24.
103. 26 U.S.C. § 132(a)(4), (e)(1) (2012).
104. Id That Code provision is specifically directed at benefits provided to employees, but a
Treasury Regulation issued under that section extends the term "employee" to include all recipients
of such a benefit. 26 C.F.R. § 1.132-l(b)(4) (as amended in 1993).
105. 26 U.S.C. § 132(e)(1); 26 C.F.R. § 1.132-6 (as amended in 1992).
106. 26 C.F.R. § 1.132-6.
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room) or (2) in an effort to induce the creation of a new business rela-
tionship (as in the case of free samples at your local grocery store). Per-
sonal-data exchanges typically do not fall within either situation. The
benefit received by a data provider is the entirety of the compensation
that she receives for engaging in a business relationship with a data ag-
gregator-it is not received as incident to an existing commercial rela-
tionship. Additionally, the "free" digital products of the Internet are often
not provided to induce a future purchase of that very product.0 7 Face-
book does not give a free month of access to its social-media site in order
for it to sell a year's worth of access. It provides ongoing access as part
of a continuous data exchange.
We must also recognize that looking at each individual instance of a
personal-data barter fails to account for the aggregate value of the digital
products received by taxpayers over the course of a year. Treasury Regu-
lations explaining the de minimis rule give examples like "occasional
cocktail parties" or "coffee, doughnuts, and soft drinks." 08 Digital prod-
ucts that are continuously available are different. First, they are not an
occasional splurge; they represent a significant aspect of the economy
and how we spend our free time. Again, economists have estimated that
the free services of the Internet create over $100 billion of consumer
surplus in the United States each year.1 09 The issue is not that personal-
data transactions have no or de minimis value; it is that the value is
spread among many micro-transactions.o That makes administering a
tax on those transactions very difficult, but it does not change the fact
that those transactions do generate value for data providers."
107. This is different for businesses that offer free applications as an incentive for users to
purchase in-app upgrades or improvements. That business model is labeled as the "freemium" mod-
el. See Vineet Kumar, Making "Freemium" Work, HARV. Bus. REv., May 2014, at 27-29,
https://hbr.org/2014/05/making-freemium-work (explaining the "freemium" business model). The
game "Clash of Clans" is an incredible example of this business model. The game can be download-
ed for free, but players can purchase in-game upgrades. That approach has been wildly successful as
the game generated $1.8 billion of revenue in 2014. Stuart Dredge, Clash of Clans Heads 2014's
Billion-Dollar Mobile Games - Open Thread, GUARDIAN (Dec. 9, 2014, 2:30 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/dec/09/clash-of-clans-billion-dollar-mobile-games.
How the Tax Code should apply to the provision and receipt of these freemium services is certainly
worth considering, but cannot be undertaken within the confines of this Article.
108. 26 C.F.R. § 1.132-6.
109. Brynjolfsson & Oh, supra note 82, at 3. Others have valued a single Gmail account at
over $3500 and have estimated that its value grows by over $1000 each year. Jay Garmon, What is
My Gmail Account Actually Worth?, BOSTINNO (July 25, 2012, 4:56 PM),
http://bostinno.streetwise.co/channels/what-is-my-gmail-account-actually-worth/. The valuation
method used was based upon the time that it would take for a person to recreate the data in one
account and uses U.S. Department of Labor statistics on the average annual salary in the United
States. Id. That method is obviously questionable because much of an e-mail account is data that is
of no value to a person. In that vein, it is worth noting that the company providing this estimate is in
the business of selling data-backup services. Nonetheless, the time that we spend using digital prod-
ucts does evidence how important and, hence, how valuable they are to us.
110. Thanks to Shu-Yi Oei for this observation.
111. There is, admittedly, some tension between this analysis and how de minimis fringe bene-
fits are often defined in practice. Continuously available coffee or tea in an office breakroom certain-
ly shares many of these same characteristics. They are provided in a number of micro transactions
166 [Vol. 94:1
TRANSACTING IN DATA
This issue is central to broader discussions regarding how technolo-
gy has changed the generation of income in the modem economy. Tech-
nology allows individuals to sell slivers of their time or their assets to
various parties rather than simply working for one employer or dedicat-
ing their assets solely to business use. They can drive for Uber at night or
on the weekends. They can use Airbnb to rent out their homes when they
are traveling. The result is that income is generated in smaller sums and
in greater numbers of transactions than when one has a single source of
compensation. The value of those transactions might be insignificant
alone, but meaningful in the aggregate. This does not mean, however,
that we exempt the income from each transaction as de minimis. Rather,
we tax their aggregate value.1 12
None of this analysis is meant to suggest that personal-data transac-
tions should be taxed like income from the sharing economy. Rather, the
point of discussing these issues is to recognize that we cannot simply
raise our hands in defeat as income generation becomes fragmented or
fails to be mediated by large players. We cannot allow technology to
erode our tax bases by default in this way. It is thus no answer to say that
we can do nothing because personal-data gains are de minimis. Those
gains still constitute income in the broadest sense, and we must consider
their impact on our tax system.
This point applies equally to the application of a more flexible con-
ception of income under the Code. The analysis provided to this point
has assumed that Code § 61 extends to all economic income, as suggest-
ed by the Glenshaw Glass formulation. Some argue, however, that
Code § 61 does not extend to all income despite the broad language used
by the Supreme Court in that case. Professors Alice Abreu and Richard
Greenstein, for example, have argued that the concept of "income" under
Code § 61 is more malleable and subject to societal influences.'14 They
point to the failure of the Internal Revenue Service (the IRS) to tax the
receipt of child support payments, free samples, and record-breaking
home run balls as evidence that the definition of "income" is a standard
and their collective value might be quite high at the end of the year. Perhaps, then, personal-data
gains are not so different than existing de minimis fringe benefits. That observation is apt, but is not
necessarily problematic for the preceding analysis. First, scholars recognize that the concept of tax-
free fringe benefits has expanded in recent years and may need to be reconsidered. See Jay A. Soled
& Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, Revisiting the Taxation ofFringe Benefits, 91 WASH. L. REV. 761,
764-65 (2016) (discussing the expansion of employer-provided fringe benefits in recent years).
Second, personal-data gains are different from free cups of coffee for other reasons. Again, the
typical cup of coffee is provided incident to an existing commercial relationship, as noted above.
Further, tracking personal-data gains may be much more practicable than tracking how many cups of
tea an employee drinks. The very nature of the digital economy means that the required information
is being collected and stored in some fashion. But see infra Section II.C.4 (discussing the potential
challenges created by the ability of Internet users to hide their true identity).
112. This is achieved, practically, through the imposition of information-reporting mecha-
nisms. Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, Can Sharing Be Taxed?, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 989 (2016).
113. Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
114. Abreu & Greenstein, Defining Income, supra note 92, at 339-48.
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that is much different than the broad rule suggested by Glenshaw
Glass."5 They conclude instead that noneconomic values impact the def-
inition of income."1 6 Under their theory, the IRS must consider equity,
efficiency, and administrability in determining what benefits constitute
income under the Code.117
One could easily conclude that the receipt of "free" digital products
in today's society does not generate income under this standard-based
conception. The theoretical income that results from accessing those
products would seem to be income that the federal government would
have difficulty taxing without creating a "firestorm of controversy" much
like the theoretical income realized when one catches a record-breaking
home run ball." 8 More specifically, we might reasonably conclude that
the benefits being received by individuals are not taxable transactions
given concerns of equity, efficiency, and administrability. Indeed, those
concerns are discussed below in this Article's analysis of why individu-
als' gains from personal-data transactions ultimately will not be subject
to tax.119 It may very well be, then, that personal-data gains will not be
included in taxpayers' gross incomes, even though they constitute in-
come in an economic sense. It is imperative to recognize, though, that
excluding them from income under that theory is excluding them due to
practical concessions and not because they are not accessions to wealth.
That is a critical distinction for purposes of this Article and will be dis-
cussed in much greater detail below.
In the end, personal-data transactions appear to plainly result in
economic income to individual taxpayers because the benefits received
by taxpayers in those transactions are accessions to wealth in a broad
sense. Those transactions would therefore be taxable if Code § 61 is as
broad as Glenshaw Glass suggests. 120 If, however, Code § 61 provides a
more flexible standard, it might be that those transactions would not re-
sult in income that is taxable, but they would generate income nonethe-
less.
115. Id at 298-99, 344.
116. Id at 346.
117. Id at 345; see also Adam S. Chodorow, Ability to Pay and the Taxation of Virtual In-
come, 75 TENN. L. REV. 695, 736-41 (2008) (discussing the ability to pay as a pragmatic limitation
on the economic income that should be subject to federal income tax); Leandra Lederman, "Stranger
than Fiction": Taxing Virtual Worlds, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1620, 1658-70 (2007) (applying similar
considerations to the question of whether income from activities in "virtual worlds" like Second Life
should be taxable).
118. Abreu & Greenstein, Defining Income, supra note 92, at 342.
119. See infra Section I.C. The lack of a fair market value, or the incredibly small value, for
the benefits received in personal-data barters might be enough for some to conclude that hey do not
result in gross income under the Code. See Bryan T. Camp, The Play's the Thing: A Theory of Tax-
ing Virtual Worlds, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 25-28 (2007).
120. See Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429-31 (1955) (concluding that the
term "income" includes all "accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers
have complete dominion").
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b. Income Tax, Data Aggregators, and the Market-Exchange
Model
Just as the market-exchange model has tax consequences for indi-
vidual taxpayers, it has tax consequences for data aggregators as well. As
described above, application of that model suggests that data aggregators
should be viewed as engaging in taxable barter exchanges through which
they sell access to their digital products in exchange for consumer data.
Theoretically, they would report income on the sale of that access and
take a tax-cost basis in the data that they acquire.121 Those conclusions
follow naturally from established law and do not seem quite as troubling
as the conclusion that individual consumers hould be taxed on their per-
sonal-data gains. Data aggregators are, after all, engaged in intentional
commercial behavior.
The more difficult question that arises with respect to the data ag-
gregators' income is where it should be reported. Data aggregators will
most often operate in multiple jurisdictions, which means that they will
be subject to various rules dictating how to divide their income among
those jurisdictions.122 Those rules effectively apportion taxing power
based on how that income is characterized. For example, the Code pro-
vides that income derived from the performance of services is sourced to
the place where the services are performed, while the sourcing of income
121. A taxpayer's basis in an asset is generally his "cost" for that asset. 26 U.S.C. § 1012
(2012). When taxpayers obtain an asset in a taxable transaction, the taxpayers obtain a tax-cost basis
equal to the amount included in their income even though they do not necessarily pay a cash price
for that asset. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.61-2 (as amended in 2003) (providing that a taxpayer has a basis in
property acquired in exchange for the performance of services equal to the fair market value of the
property received); 26 C.F.R. § 1.83-1(e) (as amended in 2003) (recognizing that taxpayers obtain
basis in an asset when they pay tax on the receipt of that asset); 26 C.F.R. § 1.83-2(a) (as amended
in 2016).
122. The mechanics by which income is divided among jurisdictions go well beyond what is
needed in this Article, but some basic information will assist one who is new to international or
multistate taxation. To begin, the Tax Code generally taxes U.S. citizens and residents on their
worldwide income. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 1, 61 (2012); see also JOEL D. KUNTZ & ROBERT J. PERONI,
U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION ¶ Bl.03 (25th ed. 2016). They are allowed foreign tax credits,
however, for foreign taxes that they pay on their foreign-source income. 26 U.S.C. § 904 (2012);
KUNTZ & PERONI, supra ¶ B4.01. The result of those rules is that the U.S. essentially cedes taxing
power over that income to the foreign jurisdiction. When the taxpayer is not a U.S. citizen or resi-
dent, the U.S. only taxes the taxpayer's U.S.-source income or income that is effectively connected
with a U.S. trade or business. KUNTZ & PERONI, supra ¶ C1.02[l]. These rules are often modified by
tax treaties that provide rules particular to residents of the contracting countries. Id. ¶ C4.01 [1].
Regardless, the function of the source rules is to effectively divide taxing power over a taxpayer's
income among the jurisdictions involved.
In contrast to this method of dividing taxing power at he national level, U.S. state corpo-
rate income taxes generally divide a taxpayer's income by the use of an apportionment method.
Under that system, income is not generally attributed to a particular jurisdiction and taxed by that
jurisdiction. 2 HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 91, ¶¶ 8.01, 8.04. But see id. ¶ 8.04 (ex-
plaining that certain types of income are "allocated"). Rather, a business's income is apportioned
among the states by looking at the mix of a taxpayer's property, payroll, and sales around the coun-
try. Id. ¶¶ 8.05, 8.15. The precise weight given to each particular factor differs by state and can
sometimes be zero. The result is that 100% of a taxpayer's sales could be attributed to State A, but if
100% of its property and payroll are in State B, it could pay tax on only one-third of its income to
State A.
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from the sale of physical inventory depends on a number of factors, in-
cluding whether the inventory was created or acquired.12 3 U.S. states
apportion income according to different rules as well, and states' rules
are not consistent with one another. For example, different rules apply to
the apportionment of income from services,124 but states generally appor-
tion income from inventory sales to the state where the property is deliv-
ered.125
That issue is of critical importance to our understanding of the taxa-
tion of data aggregators' gains from personal-data transactions. A typical
personal-data transaction is one in which a consumer uses a cloud-based
website in exchange for personal data.1 26 The data aggregator in that situ-
ation should be viewed as selling access to its software for data. The re-
sulting income would therefore be taxed in accordance with where in-
come from the sale of that type of access is sourced. The problem, how-
ever, is that the proper tax classification of income from the sale of ac-
cess to cloud-computing services is unclear under international and state
tax laws. Scholars recognize that such income could be treated as being
derived from the sale of a service, a sale of a product, a lease, a license,
or some mixture thereof.12 7 That issue has not yet been resolved, so we
cannot be sure where a data aggregator would source its income from a
personal-data barter. Obviously, the resolution of that issue will impact
123. 26 U.S.C. §§ 861(a)(3), (a)(6), 862(a)(3), (a)(6), 863, 865 (2012); see also KUNTZ &
PERONI, supra note 122, ¶ A2.03 (discussing the sourcing rules that apply to different types of in-
come).
124. COCKFIELD ET AL., supra note 65, at 411-23.
125. 2 HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 91, ¶12.02.
126. This is often labeled as a transaction involving "software as a service," or "SaaS." PETER
MELL & TIMOTHY GRANCE, NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE
NIST DEFINITION OF CLOUD COMPUTING 2 (2011),
http://nvipubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-145.pdf
127. See COCKFIELD ET AL., supra note 65, at 242-43, 300-02; OECD REPORT, supra note 66,
at 104-05; Walter Hellerstein & John Sedon, State Taxation of Cloud Computing, J. TAX'N, July
2012, at 27-31; David J. Shakow, The Taxation of Cloud Computing and Digital Content, 140 TAX
NOTES 333, 333-50 (2013). See generally Orly Mazur, Taxing the Cloud, 103 CALIF. L. REV. I
(2015). The question of how the tax rules should characterize and source income from the sale of
digital products is important, but beyond the scope of this Article. It is worth mentioning, however,
that income from personal-data transactions differs from the income from other sales of cloud com-
puting or software as a service transaction in many ways. For example, in the cash market, consum-
ers generally purchase access to a digital product for some set period of time, and the price is fixed
for that period. In a personal-data transaction, however, the transaction is ongoing, and the purchase
price rises with each use. Professor Mazur has recently reasoned that characterizing the sale of
access to online software as services income may be appropriate, in part, because of the retailer's
ongoing responsibility to maintain its software and its concomitant shouldering of the risk of soft-
ware failure. See Mazur, supra at 24-25. Part of the access fee thus looks like an upfront payment
for technical services to keep the website or software operations. That component is not generally a
part of the usual personal-data transaction, however, because users do not prepay for future use.
Individuals generally have no ongoing right of use, and they pay with new data each time they use a
digital product. This is important not because it suggests that personal-data transactions should not
result in services income to the data aggregator, but to highlight that the analysis of how to source
that income might be different when we discuss transactions involving data rather than cash. The
market transactions are not the same.
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how those barters are taxed, and that consequence should be kept in mind
as those analyses move forward.
2. Personal-Data Transactions and the State Sales Tax
Income taxes are obviously of great importance in the United States,
but sales taxes also play a critical role in most states' finances. It is thus
worth briefly considering whether personal-data transactions are theoret-
ically subject to those taxes. To start, state laws are generally drafted
broadly enough to apply to sales of taxable products for consideration of
any kind, so barter transactions are taxable if the items being swapped
are taxable.128 The question therefore becomes whether personal data or
digital products are taxable when sold. Those are more difficult ques-
tions. 129 Sales of data and digital products have historically not been in
the tax base because state sales taxes were adopted in the 1930sl30 and
thus applied primarily to the sale of tangible personal property and to
some services.131 Obviously, though, the rise of the Internet and digital
commerce have caused sales of digital products and services to displace
sales of tangible goods, and states have struggled with whether and how
to reform their taxes in response.132
To date, sales of data have escaped legislative attention, but many
states have now extended their consumption taxes to include digital ver-
sions of goods that would be taxable if sold in physical form.1 33 That has
generally included digital books, music, and video games.'34 Some apply
very technical rules to digital software transactions generally.'3  A few
states have more recently considered expanding those taxes to specifical-
ly cover cloud-computing transactions more broadly.136 In 2015, for ex-
128. 2 HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 91, T 19A.04[2][c]-[d].
129. See COCKFIELD ET AL., supra note 65, at 411-21, 423 (broadly discussing the issues
involved when determining whether and where cloud computing services are subject to state sales
tax).
130. 2 HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 91, 1 12.02.
131. Id. T 12.04[l].
132. Id. ¶ 13.06[l]. See generally Martin Eisenstein & Michael Carey, Transaction Taxes on
Information Technologies: The Threat, 74 ST. TAX NOTES 689 (2014).
133. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-52-301(3)(C)(iii)(a) (2016); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 139.200(1)(b) (West 2016); MIss. CODE ANN. § 27-65-26 (2016); NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-
2701.16(9) (2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:32B-3(a) (West 2014) (amended 2016); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 67-6-233(a) (2015); WIS. STAT. § 77.52(1)(d) (2015); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 39-15-103(a)(i)(P)
(2016); see also 2 HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 91, ¶¶ 13.06[1], 19A.04[2][c][vii]
(discussing the application of sales tax to digital products under states' laws and under the Stream-
lined Sales and Use Tax Agreement).
134. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-52-301(3)(C)(iii); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 139.010(9),
139.200(l)(b) (West 2016); MiSS. CODE ANN. § 27-65-26(3)(a); NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2701.16(9);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 54:32B-2(zz), 54:32B-3(a) (West 2014) (amended 2016); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 67-6-233(a)-(b); WIS. STAT. § 77.51(la), (3p)-(3pc), (17x) (2016); WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-15-
101(a)(xliii), 39-15-103(a)(i)(P) (2016).
135. See, e.g., statutes cited supra note 134.
136. Arthur R. Rosen & Hayes R. Holdemess, Cloud Computing. An Update, 77 ST. TAX
NOTES 355 passim (2015); Mark Peters & Greg Bensinger, States Eye Taxes on Streaming Video




ample, the City of Chicago extended its personal property lease transac-
tion tax to certain cloud-based services through an administrative ruling
by the city's Department of Finance.1 37 It also extended its transaction
tax on "amusements" to digital services like Netflix.s38 Tennessee has
extended its sales-tax statutes to apply specifically to remotely accessed
software.13 9 The Washington Business & Occupations Tax-a gross re-
ceipts tax-applies similarly.140 Other states have acted to the contrary
and completely exempt cloud-based software from their sales taxes.14 1
The debates about whether and how to tax these transactions are
ongoing and multifaceted.142 We can be sure, however, that attention to
this issue will only grow as the economy shifts further into the cloud.
Once states do extend their sales taxes to those digital products, the ques-
tion will be whether and how to tax that access when it is provided in
exchange for data rather than for cash. Again, bartering for a taxable
good or service does not eliminate the state sales tax, so personal-data
transactions would be taxable unless some other statutory exclusion ap-
plied.143
1440095146; Jeff John Roberts, The Taxman Comes for Cloud Companies like Netflix, and Confu-
sion Reigns, FORTUNE (Sept. 8, 2015, 8:33 AM), http://fortune.com/2015/09/08/cloud-computing-
tax/. Most states' laws have not specifically addressed cloud computing, but some states do exclude
cloud-computing transactions from their tax base, whether by statute, regulation, or administrative
guidance. See 2 HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 91, $ 13.06A[2] (comprehensively ana-
lyzing the application of state sales taxes to cloud-computing transactions).
137. CITY OF CHI., DEP'T OF FIN., PERSONAL PROPERTY LEASE TRANSACTION TAX RULING
No. 12 (2015),
http://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/rev/suppinfo/TaxRulingsandRegulations/Leas
eTaxRulingl2-06092015.pdf. The City has delayed implementation of that tax. See generally David
Sawyer, Chicago Delays Lease Tax Implementation for Cloud Computing, 77 ST. TAX NOTES 596
(2015).
138. CITY OF CHI., DEP'T OF FIN., AMUSEMENT TAX RULING No. 5 (2015),
http://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/rev/suppinfo/TaxRulingsandRegulations/Amu
sementTaxRuling5-06092015.pdf.
139. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-6-231(a) (2016).
140. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.04.050(6)(c)(i) (2016); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 458-20-
15503(203)(a) (2016).
141. This has occurred through statute, regulation, or other administrative guidance. See, e.g.,
COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-26-102(15)(c)(I)(C) (2016); IDAHO CODE § 63-3616(b) (2016); MO. CODE
REGS. ANN. tit. 12, § 10-109.050(3)(I) (2016); NEB. DEP'T OF REVENUE, NEBRASKA SALES AND
USE TAX GUIDE FOR COMPUTER SOFTWARE 3 (2011), http://www.revenue.nebraska.gov/info/6-
51 1.pdf; WYO. DEP'T OF REVENUE, COMPUTER SALES AND SERVICES (2014),
http://revenue.wyo.gov/ComputerSalesandServices.pdf
142. See generally Paul Jones, Online Services Tax Trend Raises Concerns, 77 ST. TAX NOTES
916 (2015).
143. Including personal-data barters in the tax base does not mean, of course, that taxing them
would be easy. Issues of valuation, identification, and enforcement would be prominent. See infra
Section II.C. Determining how states would tax multijurisdictional consumption of digital products
would similarly be an issue. See COCKFIELD ET AL., supra note 65, at 298-99 (providing examples
that illustrate the difficulty of imposing a consumption tax on the cross-border consumption of
digital goods). Collecting the tax would also be significantly impacted by the constitutional limita-
tions imposed on state taxing power under the Dormant Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court has
long held that states do not have the power to compel vendors to collect their sales taxes unless the
vendors have a physical presence within their boundaries. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S.
298, 309-19 (1992) (discussing the Court's nexus standard under the Dormant Commerce Clause).




The preceding analyses established that personal-data transactions
generate tax consequences for individual consumers and for data aggre-
gators, at least at a theoretical level. Whether they will generate actual
tax consequences depends on several other factors, and that issue is dis-
cussed further below. Notwithstanding that analysis, the theoretical ac-
count of personal-data taxation that has been presented herein is im-
portant for many reasons. First, as discussed above with respect to the
taxation of individual data providers, the structure of the data market
provides a nice glimpse into the broader pressures that the modem econ-
omy is placing on our traditional tax instruments. Just as the sharing
economy and the decentralization of income generation have placed
pressure on tax reporting, the ability of individuals to consume leisure
goods by selling slivers of their data or time puts structural pressure on
our income tax. As an offshoot of that idea, personal-data transactions
represent a further blurring of the line between business and personal
activities, which is a critical distinction in our current Tax Code.1" Final-
ly, personal-data transactions provide companies with an immense op-
portunity to shift their tax burdens among jurisdictions or to avoid tax all
together. To the extent that the sale of digital products is not taxed until
the acquired data are monetized, companies have a greater ability to de-
termine their own tax obligations by intentionally planning where and
how that monetization occurs. These consequences are explored more
fully in Part III.
C. Practical Impediments to Taxing Personal-Data Transfers
Notwithstanding the previous analysis, it is not particularly difficult
to appreciate that personal-data transactions are unlikely be taxed, at
net. See David Gamage & Devin J. Heckman, A Better Way Forward for State Taxation of E-
Commerce, 92 B.U. L. REV. 483, 484-86 (2012); Adam B. Thimmesch, Testing the Models of Tax
Compliance: The Use-Tax Experiment, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 1107, 1107-10, 1114 (2015). Congress
is currently evaluating legislation that would change that rule, but it continues to restrict state author-
ity and the outlook for Congressional intervention is bleak. A data aggregator that sold access to its
digital good in exchange for personal data might therefore be outside the reach of the state taxing
authority even if the transaction were included in the tax base.
It is also important to note that current rules in the U.S. might place a burden on individu-
al taxpayers to report and pay the tax of their own accord in this situation. Every state with a sales
tax has a compensating use tax, which applies when the purchaser does not remit the required
amount of tax to the vendor. Adam B. Thimmesch, Taxing Honesty, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 147, 151-
60 (2015) (comprehensively discussing the state use tax). That can occur when a purchase was
originally tax exempt, when the vendor fails to collect the tax as legally required, or when the Con-
stitution protects the vendor from the state's authority to require the collection of that tax as dis-
cussed above. Id. at 155-57 (discussing the various situations in which use taxes apply). Individual
consumers would thus have an obligation to pay use tax on the access of digital goods in exchange
for their personal data if their state's laws were drafted broadly enough. Of course, few individuals
know of or pay the use tax. Id. at 153-54 (discussing current data on use-tax compliance). Thus, it is
fair to expect that virtually no one would pay a use tax on their personal-data transactions if those
transactions were, indeed, subject to tax.
144. Compare 26 U.S.C. § 162 (2012) (providing a deduction for business expenses), with 26
U.S.C. § 262 (2012) (denying deductions for personal expenses).
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least in their current form, in the United States. There are a host of prac-
tical impediments to taxing those transactions under the theoretical con-
struct outlined above. Many of those impediments mirror the factors that
make taxing the digital economy difficult more generally (e.g., sourcing,
jurisdiction, administration, etc.). This Section, however, focuses on
some of the major obstacles and policy considerations that apply specifi-
cally to implementing a tax on data transactions. Some of those apply
equally to the imposition of tax on data aggregators and on data provid-
ers, while others apply more clearly only to the latter. In total, these in-
clude (1) seemingly insurmountable valuation problems; (2) the difficul-
ties of line drawing; (3) the distribution of the resulting tax burden; (4)
the anonymous Internet; and (5) the lack of political will. These factors
collectively undermine the ability of a tax on personal-data transactions
to meet the equity, efficiency, and administrability goals that are the
hallmarks of tax-policy analyses.14 5
1. The Uncertain Value of Personal Data nd the Digital Products
That They Buy
Perhaps the biggest barrier to applying our existing tax instruments
to personal-data transactions is the problem of how to value the personal
data and the digital products being traded. One obvious requirement for
the reporting of income is that the amount of income be determinable.146
Reporting income based upon an objective "fair market value" is well
engrained in our tax system.147 That can be difficult in the barter context,
however, because no cash is used.148 The tax law generally resolves that
problem by having taxpayers reference market transactions in the same
goods or services. Thus, if a lawyer generally charges $250 an hour, a
barter including an hour of her services would generate $250 of in-
come.149 This approach does not apply cleanly to personal-data barters,
however, because there has often never been a cash market for the bene-
fits traded on either side. There have never been real cash markets for
personal data and no one has ever paid to Google something or to use
Facebook or Instagram.50
145. Victor Fleischer, A Theory of Taxing Sovereign Wealth, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 497-98
(2009) (labeling these three factors as "the traditional tax policy goals"); Lederman, supra note 117,
at 1658 (noting that these three factors are "[tihe tax policy concerns usually considered in evaluat-
ing the appropriateness of a tax or provision"); Shu-Yi Oei, Getting More by Asking Less. Justifying
and Reforming Tax Law's Offer-in-Compromise Procedure, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1071, 1082 (2012)
(identifying these factors as the "three traditional criteria of tax policy analysis").
146. See Camp, supra note 119, at 25 ("Taxpayers cannot report as 'gross income' an econom-
ic abstraction.").
147. Id.
148. See Keller, supra note 94, at 448-51, 454-55, 457 (discussing a variety of valuation
theories in the barter context).
149. Id at 443-44.
150. The lack of a cash price for such products has resulted in some confusion regarding the
nature of the economic exchange outside of the tax area as well. For example, at least one court has
determined that state consumer-protection laws do not apply to individuals engaged in personal-data
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Valuing those products is also difficult because personal-data trans-
actions are generally ongoing rather than static. Even though a consumer
might get a similar benefit from Microsoft Word as she does from
Google Docs, she purchases those products in very different types of
transactions. A purchase of Microsoft Word involves an initial cash out-
lay that entitles her to access the software for some set period of time.151
Google Docs, in contrast, is purchased on a pay-as-you-go basis. A user
creates an account with an initial outlay of data, but need pay nothing
more if she does not use the product. Each time she does use the product,
though, she receives a greater benefit and compensates Google with
more data. That dynamic makes it difficult for us to make direct compar-
isons between the value of old economy goods and their digital, bartered-
for-data counterparts. The products may be similar, but the commercial
transactions underlying their sale are not. It is thus difficult to take valua-
tion guidance from transactions in the old economy.
One method that economists have used to value the "free" digital
products of the Internet is to value consumers' access to those products
by valuing the time that they spend using them.152 That approach works
well in getting a rough idea of the value that individuals place on those
online products. It does not tell us, however, what Google or Facebook
could charge in a cash market. Under the economists' approach, we view
consumers as paying differential amounts based on the value of their
time, 153 but cash markets do not operate in that way. Generally, a seller
demands a fixed price, and people who demand the good at or above that
price buy. The method used by economists measures the consumer sur-
plus, not the market price.154 The method also fails to recognize the dif-
ferent values that individuals might place on their time in different con-
texts. A person who makes $20 an hour at her job might use Facebook
transactions because they did not pay for the resulting service. See Hoofnagle & Whittington, supra
note 4, at 658. This has led some to argue that companies like Facebook should have to declare a
price for its product. Id. at 661-62. The zero-price construct also creates confusion for antitrust
analyses. See generally Newman, Zero-Price, supra note 7, at 198-206.
151. Historically, that period of use would be perpetuity, but Microsoft now markets cloud-
based access through which a consumer purchases the right to access the product for a more limited
duration. For example, one can purchase a year's worth of access to Microsoft's Office 365 for
seventy dollars a year. Buy Office, MICROSOFT.COM, https://products.office.com/en-us/buy/office
(last visited Aug. 20, 2016).
152. E.g., Brynjolfsson & Oh, supra note 82, at 2-6; Austan Goolsbee & Peter J. Klenow,
Valuing Consumer Products by the Time Spent Using Them, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 108, 108 (2006);
Jacques Bughin, The Web's 6100 Billion Surplus, MCKINSEY Q. (Jan. 2011),
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/mediaentertainment/the w bs _and 8364100 billion surplus.
153. Brynjolfsson & Oh, supra note 82, at 5 (stating that their model assumes "that the oppor-
tunity cost of leisure is higher for high income people").
154. Consumer surplus is the aggregate value of the difference between what consumers are
willing to pay for a product and the amount that the market demands. N. GREGORY MANKIW,
PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 135-41 (6th ed. 2012). The market price, in contrast, is based on
the aggregate supply and demand curves in the relevant market. Id at 77-78. A consumer might
therefore value an item at $20, but the market overall might demand a price of only $15. In that
situation, we would say that the product has a market value of $15, a subjective value of $20, and
that a purchase of the product results in a consumer surplus of $5 for our one consumer.
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for half of an hour to get a reprieve from work, but it is unlikely that she
would pay $10 for that pleasure. She just needs a break. It is a matter of
biology, not market preference. Determining a value under this method
therefore might be informative of the massive importance of the digital
products that are provided in today's economy, but it does not help estab-
lish market values for those products for tax purposes. Placing a market
value on the "free" digital products of the Internet is thus very difficult.
It is equally difficult to value the personal-data involved in those
exchanges. To start, each individual datum is largely worthless to an
aggregator. It is the network effects that result in significant gains to the
aggregator when enough data are collected.'5 5 Further complicating mat-
ters is the fact that the ultimate value of personal data to an aggregator
includes the value generated by that aggregator through the use of its
algorithms or other data-management tools.156 The monetized value of
those data is not the value of the raw data, and isolating the value of the
raw data may be impossible. Indeed, none of the economists interviewed
in connection with the French Report were able to provide a method for
determining that value. 57 An OECD report issued in 2013 explored the
variety of available methods for valuing personal data but noted signifi-
cant differences and potential difficulties with each.58 Ultimately, the
report looked to new developments that would create market-based esti-
mates of data's value.'59 Amusingly, the report noted that "[b]etter data is
needed to understand the economic value of personal data."'60
Valuing data barters is also difficult because of the non-rivalrous
nature of the data involved.'6 ' Data can be replicated infinitely without
any loss to the original source. That factor makes it impossible to apply
our traditional valuation metrics. Again, to value barter exchanges, we
generally look at the price at which the bartered goods or services are
traded in the cash market. An asset that sells for $50 is bartered for $50
worth of goods or services. A person would not barter that asset for $15
worth of services and deprive herself of the other $35 of value. With
personal data, however, she may have no qualms providing her $50 of
data for a benefit worth $35. She can simultaneously sell her data to an-
other buyer to generate more benefit. This makes it impossible to deter-
155. See OECD REPORT, supra note 66, at 101 (discussing the importance of network effects
in the digital economy).
156. Solove, Digital Dossiers, supra note 8, at 1113.
157. FRENCH REPORT, supra note 37, at 117.
158. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., EXPLORING THE ECONOMICS OF PERSONAL
DATA: A SURVEY OF METHODOLOGIES FOR MEASURING MONETARY VALUE 4 (2013) [hereinafter
OECD 2013 REPORT], http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/science-and-technology/exploring-the-
economics-of-personal-data_5k486qtxldmq-en; see also Jeff Lawton, Can You Quantify the Value of
Your Data?, COST MGMT., Mar.-Apr. 2015, 2015 WL 3456813.
159. OECD 2013 REPORT, supra note 158, at 33.
160. Id. at 5.




mine the value for personal data, and to apply the traditional approach to
valuing barter exchanges. Data do not have a singular value.
Overall, the valuation issues with respect to personal-data transac-
tions seem to effectively preclude their taxation, at least on an individual-
transaction basis. Unless and until a market price develops for personal
data or for the digital products that are the tools of data collection, it may
be impossible to set their value. That means that we will likely be unable
to apply our traditional tax instruments directly to those exchanges de-
spite their theoretical inclusion in the tax base.162
2. The Expansive Scope of Data Transactions
Taxing personal-data transactions would also be difficult due to the
challenges of defining the transactions to which such a tax applied. The
mind can run wild once one starts thinking about taxing data transactions
and in-kind benefits. Two academics discussing their papers at a confer-
ence are engaged in a data barter. So are two parents exchanging ideas
about which children's shoes are the most durable. Are those taxable
exchanges of data? What about a person who watches television? Does
he have a taxable accession to wealth? 63
This is clearly a problem if one seeks absolute academic tidiness.
As a practical matter, we will never tax two individuals who share tips on
how to best mow their lawns or how to cook a favorite dish, so how can
we ever tax an individual who shares that same information in exchange
for access to a web forum? Realistically, however, we draw lines all of
the time in tax law.M An underinclusive rule is better than a woefully
underinclusive rule or no rule at all. We might thus say that sharing ideas
at a conference is as much of a taxable transaction, theoretically, as using
Google Docs, but we might feel that it is okay to tax the latter and not the
former.
As a concept, then, drawing lines is fine. The difficulty is drawing
lines that actually capture the transactions that we want to tax (presuma-
162. It is worth recognizing that existing law already accounts for situations where directly
valuing the barter exchange is impossible. Keller, supra note 94, at 495 (discussing the application
of the open-transaction doctrine to this situation). In that situation, the taxation is delayed until a
barter participant monetizes the asset that was obtained. Id. Our current tax rules applicable to data
aggregators effectively provide this result. They are taxed when they monetize the data by selling
more products, selling advertising, or by generating gain in some other way. The open-transaction
doctrine does not apply so well to data providers, however, because they do not monetize the digital
products that they receive in the barter exchange. They consume them.
163. Many jurisdictions across the globe do impose taxes based on the receipt of public televi-
sion. Kimberly Massey, License Fee, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TELEVISION 1358-59 (Horace Newcomb
ed., 2d ed. 2004); Tim Masters, How is TV Funded Around the World?, BBC NEWS (Mar. 31, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-26546570. Those taxes are nominally a payment in
exchange for the television programming, but they function the same as a tax on the benefit that the
television provides.
164. See generally David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax
Law, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1627, 1632 (1999).
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bly transactions with large data aggregators) while leaving the others
untouched (perhaps personal exchanges of information). For example,
we could limit a personal-data tax to transactions (1) that involve digital
transfers of data and (2) that are commercial in nature. Under that type of
standard, a transfer of data for access to Facebook would be taxable
whereas the transfer of knowledge by two doctors having lunch would
not be taxable. What if, however, the doctors e-mailed to share infor-
mation about their recent results with a particular treatment method?
That would suddenly be taxable as an electronic transfer of information
in exchange for a commercial benefit. Limiting our view to digital trans-
fers of business information may therefore not be limited enough.
A more restrained approach might be to exclude data-for-data trans-
fers and only capture transfers of data for other benefits, like access to
digital products. The Code already defers the recognition of gain on cer-
tain transfers of "like kind" assets.'65 We could extend that statutory ex-
clusion to include all personal-data exchanges that involve data on both
sides. That would work to exclude our doctors from taxation, but again
the devil is in the details. Could Facebook argue that it is merely provid-
ing data to its users? What about CNN.com? A data-for-data exemption
might exempt too much.
None of this analysis is intended to indicate that lines could not be
drawn. However, the task would be difficult and the "safest" lines to
draw would be the most tightly drawn and thus potentially underinclu-
sive. If we were to travel down this road, significant work would need to
be done to properly determine the personal-data transactions that were
subject to tax and how to define them. That task could prove immensely
difficult in practice.
3. The Impact of a Tax on Data Providers
The valuation and line-drawing issues discussed above will likely
prevent the direct taxation of either side involved in the personal-data
barter. It is worth recognizing, however, that the imposition of tax on
individuals' personal-data gains would be particularly problematic be-
cause such a tax would likely be (1) one that disproportionately impacts
lower-income taxpayers and (2) inefficient from an economic perspec-
tive.
To start, a tax on individuals' personal-data gains would likely im-
pact lower-income taxpayers to a greater degree than higher-income tax-
165. 26 U.S.C. § 1031(a)(1) (2012). That section applies to particular assets and they must be
held for investment of business purposes. Id. Section 1031 would therefore not apply on its terms to
the personal-data barters discussed in this Article. It is the concept, however, that could be extended
to those transactions.
178 [Vol. 94:1
2016] TRANSACTING IN DATA 179
payers because, as adjusted for access,66 they use the Internet more for
leisure purposes. 67 To the extent that their leisure time is spent using the
"free" digital products received in personal-data barters, a personal-data
tax would thus likely impact them to a greater degree.16 8 Their leisure
time would be taxable whereas the leisure time of wealthier individuals
would not be taxed.169 The result is a tax that would be regressive, at
least among taxpayers with access to the Internet.170
It seems fair to expect that the use of digital products would decline
dramatically in the face of such a tax. The appeal of wishing a friend
"Happy Birthday" on Facebook would be significantly reduced if it were
accompanied with a tax bill. This would be especially true for users who
have little disposable income. The result would be that higher-income
individuals would continue to enjoy those products at a greater clip than
our lower-income individuals.171
This impact might suggest that a tax on personal data would be
largely inefficient as a reverse Ramsey tax. 172 The demand for the "free"
digital products of the Internet is likely incredibly elastic, especially
166. Our very lowest-income citizens may not have any access to Internet beyond that provid-
ed at public libraries. Usage among that population would naturally be low, but any existing usage
would likely be directed primarily to free digital products.
167. Scott Wallsten, What Are We Not Doing When We're Online?, in ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 68-70 (Avi Goldfarb et al. eds., 2015); Avi Goldfarb & Jeff Prince,
Internet Adoption and Usage Patterns Are Different: Implications for the Digital Divide, INFO.
ECON. & POL'Y, Mar. 2008, at 2, 14; Austan Goolsbee & Peter J. Klenow, supra note 152, at 110-
11.
168. Of course, the actual impact of a tax on data barters would likely be nonexistent for tax-
payers with very low income levels due to the presence of the standard deduction and personal
exemptions. 26 U.S.C. §§ 63(b), 151(a)-(c) (2012).
169. In this way, a tax on data would be a close approximation to taxing the imputed leisure
income of low-income taxpayers, but leave high-income taxpayers without a tax on the imputed
value of their leisure time. See SIMONS, supra note 98, at 52-53 (discussing the imputation of in-
come from individuals' leisure time). The vertical inequity of that result is clear.
170. The actual regressivity of a personal-data tax would depend on the current levels of Inter-
net access among income groups, the use of the "free" digital goods that would generate that tax, and
how many of the impacted individuals were subject to the tax. An empirical assessment of those
factors is well beyond the conceptual goals of this Article.
171. This impact actually highlights one benefit of the current personal-data market-it is
largely egalitarian. Individuals of every income level generally have the same purchasing power in
that market. A high-income individual obtains the same access to Google as a low-income individu-
al. They similarly obtain the same access to Facebook and to Instagram. If we taxed those benefits,
however, they might be taken out of the reach of low-income individuals. The tax cost of those
products would likely have a disproportionate impact on our poorest citizens.
172. A Ramsey tax is a tax directed at goods or services that have the lowest elasticities of
demand. The goal of such a tax is to reduce the distortions that taxes create in the market. See Joseph
Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax over an Ideal Income
Tax, 58 STAN. L. REv. 1413, 1420 n.10 (2006) ("Under Ramsey taxation, we should levy a tax on
goods with low elasticity of demand because the quantities consumed are likely to change less when
subject to taxation as compared to goods with high elasticities . . . ."); Terrance O'Reilly, Principles
of Efficient Tax Law: Apocrypha, 27 VA. TAX REV. 583, 593-94 (2008) (discussing the inverse
elasticity rule); see also F. P. Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 EcON. J. 47, 47
(1927) (analyzing how to design taxes so as to minimize utility losses). A reverse Ramsey tax would
thus be a tax on items with very high elasticities of demand and would maximize market distortions.
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among less-affluent citizens. We can thus fairly question whether such a
tax would serve any role at all.73
4. The Anonymous Internet
Another practical impediment to taxing individuals on their person-
al-data gains is the fact that the Internet operates largely anonymously.174
Some websites do require individuals to provide their identity in ex-
change for services, and users can intentionally give up their anonymity
to access those sites. Users can falsify that information, though, so we
may not be certain that their identities are truly known. Further, it seems
that it is more often the case that individuals can access digital products
without disclosing their identities at all. Many websites do not require a
customer account, and those that do often allow the use of pseudonyms.
Of course, one basic principal underlying this Article is that data
aggregators are able to identify individuals and obtain highly detailed
information based only on their online activities even without the users'
knowledge or consent.175 Websites can track users through their IP ad-
dresses, for example, and combine that information with other known
information to identify the particular user.176 For the majority of users,
then, there may be no true anonymity in a general sense. Knowing an
individual user's identity for marketing purposes, though, is not the same
as knowing that identity for tax purposes. Google might know that your
IP address is being used to conduct a web search, but it does not neces-
173. The efficiency analysis in this paragraph does not even touch on the incredibly high
administrative costs that would be involved with a tax on personal-data gains. Taxpayer compliance
with such a tax would hinge on the existence of a third-party reporting structure for those transac-
tions. See Leandra Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps to Reduce the Tax Gap: When Is Infor-
mation Reporting Warranted?, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1733, 1737-41 (2010) (discussing the im-
portance of third-party information reporting for tax compliance and when its costs are warranted);
see also Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in Tax Compli-
ance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695, 697-98 (2007). See generally Susan C. Morse, Tax Compliance and
Norm Formation Under High-Penalty Regimes, 44 CONN. L. REv. 675, 679 (2012). The compliance
rate for income that is not subject to third-party withholding or information reporting is estimated to
be less than fifty percent. Theodore Black et al., Federal Tax Compliance Research: Tax Year 2006
Tax Gap Estimation 1, 3 (Mar. 2012) (Internal Revenue Serv., Research, Analysis, and Statistics
Working Paper), http://www.irs.gov/publirs-soi/06rastgl2workppr.pdf (reporting an estimated
voluntary compliance rate of forty-four percent for income that is not subject to information report-
ing or withholding). That would likely involve either the data ggregator or potentially the data
provider's Internet Service Provider. Either would have difficulty both valuing the personal-data
transactions and identifying the person to whom the information report should be directed. See supra
Section II.C.1 (discussing the valuation difficulties with taxing personal-data transactions); see also
infra Section II.C.4 (discussing the difficulties of the anonymous internet). The sheer volume of the
personal-data transactions that occurs would also create extreme administrative difficulties. In the
end, then, the administrative costs of imposing a tax directly on personal-data transactions would
counsel against the adoption of such a tax unless technological advances significantly reduced these
concerns.
174. See COCKFIELD ET AL., supra note 65, at 31-32 (discussing the challenges that online
anonymity presents for tax compliance in the digital economy).
175. See supra Section I.A (discussing observed and inferred data).
176. As noted above, Google touts its ability to identify individual users without having to ask
for identifying information. See McDONALD, MOHEBBI & SLATKIN, supra note 22, at 3.
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sarily know that it was a visitor in your home who entered the inquiry.
Users can also make their IP addresses virtually meaningless for identifi-
cation purposes through t e use of technological tools like proxy servers
or by using services like Tor.177 Data aggregators (assisted by govern-
ment) could perhaps get through those tools of obfuscation in many cas-
es,178 but the process would likely be too costly to be reasonably practi-
cable as a requirement of tax administration.179
It can be debated whether the anonymous Internet is a net benefit or
detriment. What cannot be debated, however, is that the anonymous In-
ternet precludes the comprehensive taxation of individuals' personal-data
gains. We may be able to capture some of them, and maybe the most
valuable among them, but we cannot capture them all. It is simply im-
practical to assume that we can reasonably require digital-service provid-
ers to accurately identify all of their users and those users' access to their
digital products.
5. Political Will
One final impediment to the extension of our current tax instru-
ments to personal-data transactions is the American public's lack of ap-
petite for new taxes, especially those on Internet-based activities. The
public seems to abhor the expansion of the tax base to incorporate digital
forms of "old economy" transactions. We see this in the form of the In-
ternet Tax Freedom Act, which prevents the imposition of tax on Internet
access.18 0 We see this in opposition to the collection of sales tax on Inter-
net purchases.'8' We have more recently seen this in the disapproval of
177. Anupam Chander, Googling Freedom, 99 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 15 (2011) (discussing the use
of anonymizing technologies to assist individuals in speaking out against repressive governments);
Ira S. Rubinstein, Ronald D. Lee & Paul M. Schwartz, Data Mining and Internet Profiling: Emerg-
ing Regulatory and Technological Approaches, 75 U. CHI. L. REv. 261, 274-78 (2008) (discussing
available anonymizing technologies); About Tor, TORPROJECT.ORG,
https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en (last visited Aug. 21, 2016) (providing infor-
mation about the Tor network).
178. The term "obfuscation" is not used pejoratively in this context. The ability to hide one's
IP address can have significant benefits, whether one is reporting or accessing the Internet from
within a repressive regime or whether one wants to retain their privacy in an overly intrusive Internet
culture. See generally Chander, supra note 177, at 15; Jason Koebler, Public Libraries Will Operate
Tor Exit Nodes to Make the Service More Secure, MOTHERBOARD (July 30, 2015, 11:23 AM),
http://motherboard.vice.com/read/public-libraries-will-operate-tor-exit-nodes-to-make-the-service-
more-secure (discussing the debates surrounding, and the benefits of, Tor).
179. Of course, individuals could be taxed on these transactions indirectly through a tax on the
data aggregators. That approach would not require individual users to be personally identified. This
type of indirect-taxation approach is more fully discussed below. This Section, however, is focused
specifically on the difficulties that would be encountered if one desired to directly tax individuals on
their personal-data gains.
180. Internet Tax Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 1101(a)(1), 112 Stat. 2681, 719 (1998)
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2012)).
181. See Conservatives Oppose So-Called Marketplace Fairness Act, HEARTLAND INST.,
https://www.heartland.org/no-net-tax [https://perma.cc/P2PY-W3NB] (last updated Sept. 18, 2015,
2:43 PM) (listing a wide range of individuals and groups opposed to a federal bill that would allow
states greater authority to require online retailers to collect their taxes); see also DON'T TAX THE
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the expansion of the state sales taxes to streaming services like Netflix or
Spotify.182 The American public cares little for the theoretical complete-
ness of the tax system and seems to care deeply that the Internet be a tax-
free zone. Promoting a tax on Facebook access might just get one black-
balled from the political class. The politics in this area will thus likely
prevent any tax on individuals' or aggregators' personal-data g ins.18 3
III. TAX, PRIVACY, AND THE NEW ECONOMY
The preceding Sections establish that personal-data transactions are
technically taxable transactions, but that practical and political issues will
prevent them being taxed directly.184 That means that our tax system cur-
rently provides, and will continue to provide, an implicit tax preference
for those transactions. Transactions that would be taxable if engaged in
for cash consideration are nontaxable because they are done as digital
barters. That implicit tax exemption has implications both within and
without the field of taxation, and appreciating its existence is thus criti-
cally important for tax and non-tax scholars alike.
Within the tax field, the first takeaway from this conclusion is that
the digital economy has created a new way of generating income that
cannot be effectively taxed, and we must be cognizant of this fact as the
personal-data market continues to evolve. We have already seen signifi-
cant attention paid to the so-called sharing economy and the challenges
that it presents for our current tax instruments.18' Technology will un-
doubtedly continue to create further opportunities for tax-base erosion
INTERNET, https://donttaxtheinter.net/ (last visited Sept. 3, 2016) (compiling news stories and articles
opposing efforts to grant states greater authority to require online retailers to collect their taxes).
182. Kacey Drescher, State Dept. of Revenue to Tax Online Streaming Services, WFSA 12
NEWS (Aug. 1, 2015, 9:30 PM), http://www.wsfa.com/story/29467470/state-dept-of-revenue-to-tax-
online-streaming-services#.VZfRI9QBBLI; John Pletz, Chicago Tax on Streaming, Cloud Services
Raises Tech Entrepreneurs' Ire, CRAIN'S CHI. Bus. (July 7, 2015),
http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20150707/BLOGS] l/150709902/fear-and-loathing-over-
chicagos-new-cloud-tax.
183. Political pressure might also come as a result of the economic consequences of a unilateral
tax on personal-data transactions by the U.S. government. A tax on data aggregators, specifically,
might be viewed as just one more tax measure undermining the competitiveness of the United States
in the global economy. A market-based tax might eliminate those concerns to some extent, given the
importance of the U.S. populace to the data aggregation economy, but these considerations should be
taken into account. Thanks to Matt Schaefer for raising this point.
184. It is worth repeating that the analysis provided above has focused solely on personal-data
transactions that occur as a part of the multi-sided platform business model of companies like Face-
book and Google. As noted above, there are many personal-data transactions that occur o tside of
that business model, and the taxation of those types of data transactions might not present the same
conceptual difficulties. One prominent example is where cash discounts are given in exchange for
data, like in the context of customer-loyalty programs. Those discounts could easily be tracked and
subjected to information reporting for income-tax purposes. They might also be taken into account
for purposes of state sales taxes. See Gregg D. Barton & Andrea Templeton, The Price of Customer
Loyalty: Rewards Programs and Sales and Use Tax Issues, JDSuPRA Bus. ADVISOR (Sept. 23,
2015), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-price-of-customer-loyalty-rewards-46017/ (introduc-
ing the sales-and-use-tax issues presented by customer-loyalty programs).
185. See generally Oei & Ring, supra note 112, at 1027-30 (analyzing the tax consequences of
the sharing economy).
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within the context of the personal-data economy-and more broadly.
Recognizing the personal-data exemption is thus an important part of
taking stock of the tax base in the new economy.186
The current tax preference for the use of data as a currency also has
implications beyond the erosion of the tax base. Research suggests hat
the market for data suffers from significant inefficiencies and creates
legal issues in the privacy, consumer protection, and antitrust contexts.'87
Some scholars have even shown that large-scale data aggregation and
behavioral psychology could be combined to influence elections global-
ly.' 88 The U.S. government also frequently requests that companies pro-
vide them with information that they have gathered from users of their
applications. 189
The ramifications of personal-data transactions are thus widespread,
and the tax exemption for data has equally broad implications. To the
extent that the tax system aids in the lack of consumer salience of the
commercial exchange, implicitly promotes the use of personal data, or
effectively prevents the development of consumer-favorable data prac-
tices, we must evaluate whether and how to account for those impacts.
The following Sections address those issues. We may not be able to di-
rectly tax personal-data transactions, but that does not mean that we can
do nothing or that we can ignore the impact of our tax system on the
market for personal data. The two are intertwined. Section A provides
insight into how our tax system could best account for the current per-
sonal-data economy. That includes a discussion of (1) how to reform our
current tax instruments to at least indirectly account for the value created
by personal-data transactions and (2) the merit of creating new tax in-
struments that might supplement our current taxes and help to promote
beneficial data practices.
Section B changes the focus. Instead of looking at how the current
personal-data economy should drive changes to our tax system, it looks
at how the current tax system will impact the evolution of the personal-
186. See id. at 1027-29; Soled & Thomas, supra note 111, at 786-90 (analyzing how the
taxation of fringe benefits should be reformed for the modem economy).
187. See generally Calo, supra note 29, at 1003-04 (discussing the potential for market manip-
ulation); Hoofnagle & Whittington, supra note 4, at 608-09 (discussing the impacts of zero-price
market on consumers); Newman, Zero-Price, supra note 7, at 169-70 (discussing the role of anti-
trust law in zero-price markets). See also sources cited supra note 43 (listing a number of articles
that discuss the legal implications of the personal-data market).
1 88. See Robert Epstein & Ronald E. Robertson, The Search Engine Manipulation Effect
(SEME) and Its Possible Impact on the Outcomes of Elections, 2015 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SC. U.S.
E4512, E4512, http://www.pnas.org/content/1I 2/33/E4512.full.pdf.
189. GOOGLE TRANSPARENCY REPORT, GOOGLE,
https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/userdatarequests/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2016); Nick
Bilton, Tech Companies Offer Update on Government Data Requests, N.Y. TIMES: BITS (Feb. 3,
2014, 4:29 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/03/tech-companies-release-government-data-
requests/; Kia Kokalitcheva, Twitter Sees 52% Spike in Government and Copyright Info Requests,
FORTUNE (Aug. 11, 2015, 5:07 PM), http://fortune.com/2015/08/I /twitter-transparency-report/.
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data economy. The current tax preference for the use of personal data is
equally a tax penalty on other types of market exchanges.90 More specif-
ically, it is a tax penalty on a transfer of data for cash. As a result, even if
we would favor the latter for privacy or other reasons, our current tax
system will discourage it. That impact has thus far gone unrecognized in
the current debates regarding the personal-data economy. Section B rem-
edies the resulting void by looking at some predominant visions for the
future of the personal-data market and by analyzing how the tax system
will impact those visions. Section C concludes by calling for the recogni-
tion of the personal-data tax exemption in the broader U.S. regulatory
approach to personal data.
A. Tax and the Current Personal-Data Economy
1. The Role of Existing Tax Instruments
One way to respond to our inability to directly tax personal-data
transactions is to tax them indirectly. The way to do that in the context of
our existing tax instruments is through a tax on the monetization of per-
sonal data by the data aggregators or by their shareholders. Those mone-
tization events would generally include (1) an aggregator's sale of addi-
tional products or advertising based upon those data and (2) the sale of
stock by a shareholder of an aggregator.191 Notwithstanding the ease of
taxing those monetization events, however, it is not a perfect substitute
for taxing the initial personal-data barter.
Deferring the taxation of personal-data gains until a monetization
event could distort the taxes that are paid in several ways, including (1) if
the jurisdiction that would tax the personal-data transaction does not
have jurisdiction to tax the monetization event; (2) if the income from the
monetization event is not sourced to the same jurisdiction as would in-
come from the personal-data barter; and (3) if the monetization event is
subject to a different tax rate than the rate at which the personal-data
gains would be taxed.
To illustrate, assume that a data aggregator makes a taxable sale of a
digital product in the United States in a personal-data barter. Assume
further that the United States would tax the aggregator's income from
that sale if it could conceivably do so. Instead, however, the aggregator is
able to collect the personal data on a tax-free basis-given the limitations
190. Tax scholarship generally recognizes that the difference between a penalty for engaging in
an activity and a bonus for not engaging in that activity is one of framing. Edward J. McCaffery &
Jonathan Baron, Thinking About Tax, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 106, 115 (2006).
191. The receipt of a dividend from an aggregator would also be a monetization event, but one
that seems less likely than the others. See FRENCH REPORT, supra note 37, at 2 (noting the pressure
against issuing dividends in the digital economy). Recall also that the OECD Report minimized the
concerns related to the proper characterization of the personal-data transaction because taxing juris-
dictions' taxation of data aggregators' advertising revenue would match their taxation of the barter
transactions. OECD REPORT, supra note 66, at 104.
184 [Vol. 94:1
2016] TRANSACTING IN DATA 185
discussed above-and its shareholders experience a concomitant increase
in the value of their stock. One of its foreign shareholders then sells her
shares and monetizes a portion of the value created by the personal-data
barter. In that situation, taxing that shareholder's monetization event will
indirectly tax the personal-data barter, but in a distorted way. Instead of
the United States taxing the aggregator's gains, the foreign country will
tax its residents' gains.192 That country might also have a preferential rate
for those gains, so even the amount of tax would be lower.193 Taxing the
monetization event as a proxy for taxing the personal-data barter would
thus result in the tax revenue being shifted among jurisdictions and po-
tentially being reduced in amount.194
We could further illustrate these issues by assuming that he data
aggregator used a foreign entity to collect the data and to monetize the
value of those collected data by selling advertising. Under current United
States tax treaties, the U.S. might not have jurisdiction to tax the adver-
tising income of the foreign entity because the firm does not have a
"permanent establishment" within the U.S.'9 5 Further, even if the compa-
ny did have a permanent establishment in the country, our tax rules
might not treat that particular income as subject to U.S. tax. That income
could be classified as foreign-source income under the rules applicable to
services income.196 Due to these rules, taxing the monetization event
would not be a proxy for taxing the personal-data barter. The value cre-
ated by that barter would escape U.S. taxation completely.
192. KUNTz & PERONI, supra note 122, ¶ C3.09. A foreign shareholder is generally protected
from U.S. taxation of its gains on the sale of stock in a U.S. company. Id. Under certain conditions,
however, that gain may be subject to U.S. tax. Id.
193. See ROBERT CARROLL & GERALD PRANTE, ERNST & YOUNG LLP, CORPORATE
DIVIDEND AND CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION: A COMPARISON OF THE UNITED STATES TO OTHER
DEVELOPED NATIONS 12 (2012),
http://www.theasi.org/assets/EYASI DividendandCapital Gains InternationalComparison Re
port 2012-02-03.pdf (reporting that "[a]bout four-fifths of the OECD and BRIC countries tax capital
gains at rates below the rates applied to ordinary income").
194. This might be true even if the shareholder is a U.S. shareholder. A U.S. individual's gain
on the sale of an aggregator's stock might well qualify as long-term capital gain, which is subject to
a preferential rate of taxation. 26 U.S.C. § 1(h)(1) (2012). A shareholder could also be tax exempt of
course.
195. KUNTZ & PERONI, supra note 122, TT Al.04. Countries' tax jurisdiction is often deter-
mined by reference to bi-lateral tax treaties, which typically limit a country's taxing power to firms
that have established a "permanent establishment" within it. Id. TT A 1.04, C4.05. Historically, estab-
lishing a permanent establishment has required certain types of physical presence within a taxing
jurisdiction. Id. ¶ C4.05[2].
196. The Code does not provide a sourcing rule that specifically addresses advertising income.
In the context of "old economy" advertising, advertising revenue has been sourced according to the
U.S. tax rules applicable to services income. See Peidras Negras Broad. Co. v. Comm'r, 43 B.T.A.
297, 312 (1941), nonacq., 1941-1 C.B. 18, aff'd, 127 F.2d 260 (5th Cir. 1942); see also Gary D.
Sprague et al., Federal Taxation of Software and E-Commerce, Tax Mgmt. Portfolio (BNA) [U.S.
Income Portfolios Library] No. 555, pt. II, § B.3. Under that rule, advertising income is sourced to
the location where the services are performed. 26 U.S.C. §§ 861(a)(3), 862(a)(3) (2012). That rule,
of course, may not be appropriate in the digital economy if we desire to shift to a more complete
market-based sourcing regime. See Assaf Y. Prussak, The Income of the Twenty-First Century:
Online Advertising as a Case Study for the Implications of Technology for Source-Based Taxation,
16 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 39, 62-70 (2013).
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These illustrations are not meant to suggest that giving attention to
indirectly taxing personal-data barters would be pointless. To the contra-
ry, the issues regarding taxing jurisdiction and the proper sourcing of
income from digital transactions are at the core of the discussions cur-
rently being undertaken with respect to how to tax digital transactions
more generally. Recognizing the role of personal-data transactions in that
economy, however, both adds to the importance of those discussions and
colors how we view those issues. The personal-data barter particularly
adds to the discussions regarding expanding the permanent-establishment
concept beyond physical presences.1 9 7 It also informs our discussions of
how to tax transactions involving cloud-based services. Those transac-
tions often include a payment with data, which means that taxing those
transactions will be done indirectly through the taxation of the data ag-
gregators' sales or advertising revenue. The result might be that we need
to align the rules for sourcing those categories of income as a way to
reduce the tax distortions created by the personal-data exemption.
The sum of this analysis is that discussions regarding how to best
reform our tax systems for the digital age should consider how to best
account for the fact that personal-data transactions are going untaxed. If
we are going to use the corporate income tax on advertising revenue as a
proxy for taxing those transactions, we will need to ensure that he juris-
dictional and sourcing rules reflect that role. Critically, we will also need
to maintain that ax. That realization is one important takeaway from this
analysis-the corporate income tax will play a critical role in the tax
system of the future because it is likely the most direct and comprehen-
sive way of taxing the value derived by personal-data transactions. Its
elimination would significantly reduce the opportunities for our tax sys-
tem to capture that value. A consumption tax is not going to fill that role.
This realization is important because it cuts against a significant
body of work that is aimed at critiquing the corporate income tax as a
normative matter and that often does so in connection with a call for
greater reliance on consumption taxes.'98 It does, however, support the
197. See, e.g., COCKFIELD ET AL., supra note 65, at 468 (discussing potential expansion of the
permanent-establishment concept to reflect modem business realities); FRENCH REPORT, supra note
37, at 4, 63-64, 113-15 (discussing the challenges that the digital economy creates under traditional
conceptions of a permanent establishment); OECD REPORT, supra note 66, at 78-79, 88, 100-02,
106-11, 147-48 (discussing the potential expansion of the permanent-establishment concept to
include digital presences). It is important to note, of course, that the OECD rejected the adoption of
an economic-nexus type permanent-establishment rule in its recent BEPS Project. Id. at 148 (noting
that a digital permanent-establishment concept was not recommended due to the anticipated benefits
from other proposals).
198. The literature critiquing the corporate income tax is voluminous. See Rueven S. Avi-
Yonah, Corporations, Society, and the State: A Defense of the Corporate Tax, 90 VA. L. REV. 1193,
1197 (2004) (noting the extensive critique of corporate income tax and that "no academic has in
recent years mounted a serious, convincing normative defense of why this cumbersome tax should
be retained"); Omri Marian, Jurisdiction to Tax Corporations, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1613, 1622-23
(2013) ("[O]ne thing that legal scholars and public finance economists agree upon (a rare occasion
indeed), is that corporate taxation, as a legal model, is absolutely inefficient."); Darien Shanske, A
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idea that reliance on different tax instruments is beneficial as a way of
controlling for the weaknesses inherent in each tax.199 The conclusion is
therefore important as we continue to analyze optimal tax design. We
may not like the corporate income tax as a matter of economic efficien-
cy, but it can be used to address the challenges that the digital economy
creates for our personal income taxes and consumption taxes. Further
attention to capital-gains preferences, jurisdictional limits, and the proper
sourcing of income are thus warranted given the continued growth of the
personal-data economy.200
2. The Potential Role for Alternative Tax Instruments
The preceding Part has focused on how current tax instruments
could be modified to address the personal-data economy. It may be,
though, that the best way to approach the current personal-data exemp-
tion is to adopt completely new tax instruments that more directly ad-
dress the personal-data market. Those new tax instruments could help
both to offset lost tax revenue and to encourage the development of bene-
ficial data-protection practices and technology. This approach is consid-
ered in the French Report, the OECD Report, and to an extent by gov-
ernments worldwide.
The French Report specifically suggests a special tax on companies
that collect data through the "regular and systematic monitoring of users'
activity." 201 The tax would apply only to aggregators who monitor more
than a particular number of users, and the report specifically suggests
202that such a tax could be an actual charge per monitored user. The
OECD Report proposed consideration of an "equalization levy . .. as an
alternative way to address the broader direct tax challenges of the digital
economy."203 The report proposed alternative bases for such a tax, in-
New Theory of the State Corporate Income Tax: The State Corporate Income Tax as Retail Sales
Tax Complement, 66 TAX L. REV. 305, 327 (2013) (noting the "ferocious debate" regarding whether
consumption or income taxes are ideal).
199. See generally David Gamage, The Case for Taxing (All of) Labor Income, Consumption,
Capital Income, and Wealth, 68 TAx L. REV. 355, 357-58 (2015) (arguing that the weaknesses in
one form of taxation can be mitigated through the application of a different form of taxation that
does not suffer the same weaknesses).
200. One other interesting caveat to this discussion is that states' tax systems are currently
much better structured to handle these issues than our federal tax system. This is largely because
states have a greater ability than the federal government to tax firms that have no physical presence
within their boundaries and many already use market-state sourcing methods. 2 HELLERSTEIN &
HELLERSTEIN, supra note 91, TT 6.11[1], 9.18[3][a], 10.07 (discussing U.S. states' taxing jurisdic-
tion, the use of market-state sourcing rules, and the move away from the cost-of-performance stand-
ard); Adam B. Thimmesch, The Illusory Promise of Economic Nexus, 13 FLA. TAX REV. 157, 161-
87 (2012) (discussing the economic-nexus standard for state taxing jurisdiction); Douglas A. Wick,
A Categorization of State Market Sourcing Rules, 74 ST. TAX NOTEs 351, 351 (2014) ("The cost of
performance method is waning, and market sourcing is taking its place."). In addition, the structure
of the state corporate income tax may allow it to be a rough proxy for the consumption taxes that are
going uncollected on personal-data transactions. Shanske, supra note 198, at 308, 315-17.
201. FRENCH REPORT, supra note 37, at 121-23.
202. Id. at 123.
203. OECD REPORT, supra note 66, at 115-17.
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cluding data gathered from in-country users.204 An excise tax on data
transfers starts to look indistinguishable from a "bit tax," which has been
proposed for years.205
Several countries have also implemented or discussed diverted prof-
its taxes-often referred to as "Google taxes"-that seek to ensure that
corporations do not escape taxation through the use of clever corporate
206structuring. Those diverted profits taxes operate by imposing some
minimum level of tax on companies who are deemed to have engaged in
abusive activities to artificially lower their tax burden.207 Although those
taxes are not specifically tied to the personal-data economy, they would
impact firms that operate in that space and use international tax structur-
ing to avoid income tax on their gains. Other forms of alternative tax
instruments are undoubtedly possible and further thought should be giv-
en to those options.
It is also worth recognizing that a new tax could be used not only to
raise revenue, but also-or alternatively-to positively influence how
data are collected and used. For example, a tax could be structured so
that the actual tax rate is tied to the adoption of certain prescribed stand-
ards.208 For example, the tax rate could be reduced for taxpayers that
implemented best practices published by the government or who provid-
ed more consumer control over their data. The particular tax-rate "trig-
ger" could also be used to help to spur positive technological develop-
ments that might allow greater data protection. In that vein, some have
posited that the technology behind Bitcoin-blockchain-could be used
to allow individuals better control over access to their data.209 An alterna-
204. Id at 116. This type of tax could be viewed as the new-economy version of a severance
tax. U.S. states have long imposed those taxes on the extraction of resources like coal, oil, and tim-
ber. 2 HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 91, if 4.18, 4.18[1]. It might be fair to view per-
sonal data as a natural resource of a source jurisdiction in the digital economy and tax its extraction
consistent with these historic taxes.
205. A bit tax is a transactional tax on the "transmission of digital information." COCKFIELD ET
AL., supra note 65, at 480 n.45. The bit tax proposals have been largely undermined by the practical
concerns inherent in such a tax. Id.
206. Budget 2015. 'Google Tax' Introduction Confirmed, BBC NEWS (Mar. 18, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-31942639; Giuseppe Fonte & Gavin Jones, Italy's Renzi Faces
Uphill Struggle over Google Tax Plan, REUTERS (Sept. 30, 2015, 11:38 AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/30/us-italy-tax-internet-analysis-
idUSKCNORUIHS20150930; Michael Herh, Taxing Google: Government to Introduce Google Tax
Next Year, BUSINESSKOREA (Oct. 19, 2015, 6:15 PM),
http://www.businesskorea.co.kr/english/news/ict/1 2539-taxing-google-govemment-introduce-
google-tax-next-year.
207. Karen Hughes et al., The U.K. Diverted Profits Tax, 123 J. TAX'N 37, 37-39 (2015); J.
Harold McClure & Saumyanil Deb, The Google Tax: Transfer Pricing or Formulary Apportion-
ment?, J. INT'L TAX'N, June 2015, at 61.
208. This approach was also recommended in the French Report. FRENCH REPORT, supra note
37, at 123.
209. Guy Zyskind et al., Decentralizing Privacy: Using Blockchain to Protect Personal Data
180-84 (May 21-22, 2015) (research paper prepared for 2015 IEEE CS Security and Privacy Work-
shops), http://ieeexplore.iece.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber-7163223; Guy Zyskind et al., Enigma:




tive tax that did not apply where that technology was used might give a
nice nudge to support its development and implementation.2 10 The law
would not require it, but it would promote it.
In the end, this is not the place to promote particular policy goals or
to suggest particular tax instruments to achieve those goals. Further
scholarship should explore those issues. What is important is that we
recognize the interplay between the tax system and our broader policy
goals related to data and data protection. It is possible that we could craft
alternative tax instruments to address both the tax and privacy concerns
raised by the personal-data market.
B. Tax and the Personal-Data Economy of the Future
Many scholars and individual consumers have been unhappy with
the current state of the data market, and they have pushed for a market in
which individuals have greater control over the collection and use of
their data.211 Those efforts have begun to have effect. For example, con-
sumers are now taking advantage of applications that allow them to easi-
212
ly see and block particular tracking programs. Consumers are also
adopting ad blockers in greater numbers.2 13 Those efforts impede the
collection of observed data and undermine the multi-sided business mod-
el by preventing websites from offering better-identified "targets" for
advertising. A recent study suggests that the use of those blockers will
214result in the loss of nearly $22 billion of ad revenue per year.
Of course, when consumers block online tracking and the advertis-
ing that results, data aggregators fail to benefit from offering their digital
products. This has not gone without notice, and that changed value prop-
osition has very recently been recognized as a threat to the "free" Inter-
215net. Some sites have responded by blocking users who use ad block-
210. Importantly, that type of "trigger" might well tie into traditional tax concepts. If a user has
the right to unilaterally and completely revoke their data at any time, we can fairly question the value
of the barter to the aggregator. The aggregator receives an asset, but also grants the provider with a
unilateral call option with a zero strike price.
211. See supra Section I.B.
212. Add-ons, MOZILLA.ORG, https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/extensions/?sort=users
(last visited Oct. 23, 2016) (listing a Ghostery, an add-on that blocks tracking programs, as a most
popular extension for the Firefox browser); Owen Williams, You Should Be Using These Browser
Extensions to Keep Yourself Safe Online, TNW (May 18, 2015),
http://thenextweb.com/apps/2015/05/18/you-should-be-using-these-browser-extensions-to-keep-
yourself-safe-online/ (discussing several programs that block tracking programs online).
213. PAGEFAIR & ADOBE, supra note 60, at 1, 4.
214. Id. at 3; Elizabeth Dwoskin, Ad-Blocking Software Will Cost the Ad Industry $22 Billion
This Year, WALL STREET J.: DIGITS (Aug. 10, 2015, 6:28 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/201 5/08/1 0/ad-blocking-software-will-cost-the-ad-industry-22-billion-
this-year/?mod=e2tw; Mark Scott, Study of Ad-Blocking Software Suggests Wide Use, N.Y. TIMES:
BITS (Aug. 10, 2015, 12:01 AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/08/10/study-of-ad-blocking-
software-suggests-wide-use/.
215. Hayley Tsukayama, Online Ad-Blocking Is on the Rise. That's Bad News for Everyone.,
WASH. POST: THE SWITCH (Aug. 10, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2015/08/10/online-ad-blocking-is-on-the-rise-thats-bad-news-for-everyone/. See general-
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ers.216 Others have moved to a subscription model, and one research firm
posited that 2016 would be a tipping point in that regard.2 17 Its analysis
suggests that more firms might begin implementing a "freemium" model
where consumers can continue to use a basic service for free but also pay
218a fee to avoid tracking and/or advertising.
Some have responded to the personal-data market by pushing for
change in the other direction. Instead of working towards a model where
individuals pay to not be tracked, they have focused on a model under
which consumers are paid cash compensation for their data. This in-
cludes the payment for data stored in "personal data banks" or "personal
data vaults" 219 and micropayments based upon the use of data without the
same centralization of control.220
All of these models address the privacy concerns inherent in the
current personal-data market,221 but they could suffer from a significant
tax disadvantage. To start, the freemium model removes perhaps the
most critical impediment to taxing personal-data barters-the valuation
problem. If Facebook determines a price for accessing its service without
being tracked or subjected to advertising, it sets a value that could be
used for tax purposes. A tax administrator could argue that the fee repre-
sents the market price for the digital product or the personal data normal-
ly traded for that product and that a consumer who purchases that good
with their data or their time has an accession to wealth in that amount.
ly PAGEFAIR, https://pagefair.com/about/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2016) (providing information about
PageFair, which is a company that seeks to address the interests of advertisers, consumers, and
publishers).
216. Molly Brown, Use an Ad Blocker? The Washington Post Is Now Probably Blocking You,
GEEKWIRE (Sept. 10, 2015, 9:49 AM), http://www.geekwire.com/2015/use-an-ad-blocker-the-
washington-post-is-now-probably-blocking-you/.
217. See Daniel Heppner, AdBlock Pressuring YouTube into a Paid Subscription Model,
GAZETTE REV. (Sept. 27, 2015), http://gazettereview.com/2015/09/adblock-pressuring-youtube-into-
a-paid-subscription-model; Taylor, supra note 62.
218. See Taylor, supra note 62.
219. Jerry Kang et a]., Self-Surveillance Privacy, 97 IOWA L. REV. 809, 828-29 (2012) (pro-
posing "personal data guardians" to curate the personal data vaults); Thomas Heath, Web Site Helps
People Profit from Information Collected About Them, WASH. POST (June 26, 2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/web-site-helps-people-profit-from-information-
collected-aboutthem/2011/06/24/AGPgkRmH story.html; Min Mun et al., Personal Data Vaults: A
Locus of Control for Personal Data Streams (Nov. 30-Dec. 3, 2010) (research paper prepared for the
Sixth International Conference on Emerging Networking Experiments and Technologies (CoN-
EXT)), http://conferences.sigcomm.org/co-next/2010/CoNEXTpapers/17-Mun.pdf; How It Works,
DATACOUP, https://datacoup.com/docs (last visited Oct. 23, 2016); POWR OF YOU,
https://www.powrofyou.com/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2016); TEAMDATA, https://personal.com (last
visited Oct. 23, 2016).
220. LANIER, supra note 54, at 20, 274-75, 286-87 (discussing the nano-payment approach).
221. They address the privacy concerns only to the extent that (1) personal data are no longer
collected by the data aggregators or (2) consumers are adequately paid for their personal data or,
alternatively stated, their privacy loss. Under a freemium model where consumers merely pay to
avoid advertising, the privacy implications of data collection would not be addressed.
TRANSACTING IN DATA
The introduction of a cash option could thus make it easier to tax those
who do not take that option.222
The data-bank model presents a similar tax problem because it re-
moves several of the key impediments to taxing personal-data sales.
First, it centralizes the transfer of an individual's data so that those trans-
fers are easily identifiable. It also ensures that we know exactly when
and how an individual's data were accessed and what the individual got
in return for that access. Finally, it removes a layer of anonymity and
establishes a third party-the data bank operator-that can be subject to
information-reporting and withholding obligations. These factors might
very well prevent the widespread adoption of the data-bank model. They
could turn a non-taxable barter into a taxable sale with the result that
individuals could see the purchasing power of their data decline by up to
40% or more.223
These results highlight the distortion that the current tax exemption
creates in the market for data and reveal one simple, but critical insight
of this Article-that the current tax preference for personal-data barters
is equally a tax penalty on other forms of market transactions. All else
being equal, the tax law favors the former and places a burden on any
move to the latter. Any suggested change to the personal-data market
will have to take that into account.
These considerations apply even if we assume a personal-data mar-
ket that does not evolve to introduce cash compensation somewhere in
the exchange. The Vendor Relationship Management (VRM) approach,
for example, allows consumers to more effectively barter with their data
rather than allowing them to be paid in cash.224 Doc Searls, a noted tech-
nology author, lays out his view of a VRM world in detail in his book
titled The Intention Economy.225 In that book, he envisions a world where
users take a very active role in the use and dissemination of their data.
For example, they might agree to share their location, purchase history,
and payment data with a coffee shop in order to ensure that their lattes
222. Of course, users who opt to take the "free" version could credibly argue that the benefit
that they receive is worth less than the value of the premium product. To begin, a free version that
suffered from intrusive advertising would certainly have a lower intrinsic value to a consumer.
Second, a user who declined the premium version would necessarily not value that version at its
asking price-they would have purchased it otherwise. The actual valuation would thus depend on
the precise product offering. A subscription fee that only preempted data collection-and not adver-
tising-would be most likely to represent the taxable value of the personal data generally collected
by the aggregator. A subscription fee that only preempted advertising would be least likely to repre-
sent the value of that personal data. The fee in that case would be most related to the negative value
of viewing advertising and not the value of personal data.
223. The top marginal tax rate for the federal income tax is currently 39.6%. 26 U.S.C. § 1
(2012). Many individuals would also have to pay state income taxes on their cash payments, and
some might have to pay sales taxes on the goods that they purchased with that cash.
224. See supra Section I.B (discussing the VRM Project at Harvard's Berkman Klein Center).
225. See generally SEARLS, supra note 51.
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226are waiting for them at the counter when they arrive. They agree to
share those data, however, only if the vendor agrees with how they will
be used.
A data approach where users control their data is one that is con-
sistent with the current expanded use of ad blockers, Do Not Track tech-
nology, and other methods of depriving aggregators of their data or the
benefits of those data. Data providers and data aggregators might find the
VRM approach more palatable than those other approaches, however,
because it might allow for more acceptable advertising, which would
227allow the continued use of the advertising-funding model.2 Consumers,
in turn, might not feel the need to block advertising or all tracking if they
had more control.228
The tax consequences of a VRM approach that focuses on user con-
trol rather than on cash remuneration are more complicated than those
discussed above. To the extent that the personal-data market evolves to
give users more control, but without introducing cash transactions, the
tax system may be unable to tax them for the lack of a method of valua-
tion. However, to the extent that individuals more purposefully use their
data and do so to greater personal benefit, taxation might become more
compelling and perhaps more realistic. Further, to the extent that a VRM
approach relies on a central access point for one's data, then there would
again be one single source of information on the extent of an individual's
data bartering. We would no longer drop data like breadcrumbs as we
travel across the Internet. We would sell them from a storefront.
This Section has discussed only some of the possible futures for the
personal-data market. Regardless of which way the commercial Internet
ecosystem evolves, however, there are at least two questions that we will
need to ask ourselves. First, do the technologies that we are considering
undercut any of the current impediments to the taxation of the personal-
data economy? Second, do those strategies or technologies make it more
compelling that transactions in data be taxed as a normative matter? If
the answer to either is "yes," then proponents of those developments
must address how to handle the potential tax penalty on that type of mar-
ket evolution. For better or worse, the tax system currently provides a
preference for the voluminous, anonymous, obfuscated data-collection
practices that occur online. The impact of that tax preference may very
well be to work against otherwise beneficial developments in the person-
al-data economy, and we must keep that factor in mind as we consider
how to best reform that economy.
226. Id. at 11-12.
227. See Doc Searls, How #adblocking Matures from #NoAds to #SafeAds, HARV. BLOGS: DOC





C. A Unified Regulatory Approach to Personal Data
The personal-data economy impacts many areas of our lives and, as
a result, the effects of the tax exemption for personal data extend far be-
yond our revenue system. The final policy proposal of this Article is
therefore that this tax exemption be taken into account in the broader
U.S. regulatory structure related to personal data and personal privacy.
The tax exemption for transactions in data is a regulatory benefit provid-
ed to the personal-data market, and it should be recognized as such.
The government clearly has non-tax interests in regulating the per-
sonal-data market. The Federal Trade Commission, for example, regu-
lates the data market to protect consumer privacy and data security.229 it
is thus reasonable for the nation's regulatory policies to take a holistic
view of the government's role in that market. As noted above, the per-
sonal-data tax exemption represents nothing more than a regulatory ben-
efit provided to those operating in the personal-data economy. It thus
functions to promote the use of data as a payment method rather than the
use of cash. Viewed in this way, it seems advisable for the government to
take that benefit into account as it evaluates the merits of regulating other
aspects of the personal-data economy. For example, privacy regulations
imposed by Congress or actions taken by the FTC might impose costs on
the data industry, and viewed alone, those regulations might not survive
a typical cost-benefit analysis. Viewed in context, however, those costs
might merely offset the current regulatory benefit provided to that indus-
try by our tax system and thus might function well to offset the ineffi-
ciency that the personal-data exemption represents. Taking into account
the tax benefit provided by the personal-data exemption might therefore




Scholars in a number of fields have evaluated the impact of the
wide-scale data collection, analysis, and commodification that nearly
229. See generally FED. TRADE COMM'N, 2014 PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY UPDATE (Jan.
2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/privacy-data-security-update-
2014/privacydatasecurityupdate_2014.pdf ( iscussing the Commission's efforts to protect consumer
privacy and data security); Calo, supra note 43, at 681-85 (discussing the role of the FTC in this
area).
230. A comprehensive cost-benefit approach for data regulation would also be entirely con-
sistent with how the federal government evaluates regulatory action by executive agencies. See
Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 102-
03 (2012); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 3-4, 6-7 (1995) (describing the origins of the federal government's use of cost-benefit
analyses with respect to evaluating federal regulations); Amy Sinden, Formality and Informality in
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 93, 148-52 (2015) (discussing the current status of the
federal rules regarding cost-benefit analyses). Notably, Executive Order 13,563 recognizes that
economic activities are regulated by multiple agencies and calls for coordination across those agen-




defines the modem economy. To date, however, tax scholars and our tax
laws have ignored this market. This Article addresses that void by
providing a comprehensive analysis of how transactions in data should
be viewed for purposes of our domestic tax laws. That analysis shows
that personal-data transactions are market exchanges that fall within the
reach of our nation's tax laws. There are, however, many practical im-
pediments to actually taxing those transactions. The result is that there
now exists, and will continue to exist, an implicit tax preference for the
use of data as a currency.
Our inability-and perhaps unwillingness-to directly tax person-
al-data transactions does not mean that those exchanges should be ig-
nored though. Those exchanges impact how we view and address the
broader challenges that the modem economy presents for our taxing sys-
tems. They might also justify alternative forms of tax instruments that
would indirectly tax their value or that would promote positive social
goals with respect to data collection and protection.
The tax exemption for personal-data transactions also impacts how
we address the market for data more broadly. First, privacy scholars and
technologists working on how to best modify that market to better pro-
tect individual interests must understand that they are working against a
tax system that will promote the status quo. Positive data-management
practices or technologies that allow users to better control or benefit from
their data might very well also reduce the factors that currently preclude
the taxation of personal-data transactions. Finally, at a very basic level,
the tax exemption for those transactions operates as a regulatory benefit
for those transactions. That benefit should be taken into account in the
broader U.S. regulatory structure surrounding personal data, privacy, and
the new economy.
194 [Vol. 94:1
